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Abstract
The principal object of this Article is to demonstrate that Islamic law, like any system of law,
is dynamic rather than static. Islamic law cannot be thought of as law disconnected from history
and society. Like any other legal system, it is influenced by political, economic and social factors.
In order to illustrate this idea, this Article takes as a case study the rulings concerning custody of
the Shari’a Appeals Court in Israel. This Article surveys the rulings of the Shari’a Appeals Court
addressing child custody from 1992 through 2001. This Article’s central claim is that the Appeals
Court’s approach to child custody underwent a metamorphosis during that period. In Part I, I
will analyze the essential features of this transition. This will require an examination of classical
Islamic law’s treatment of custody, specifically the Hanafi school’s treatment of it. I will focus on
the new interpretation that the Shari’a Appeals Court gave to custody. In Part II, I will offer an
explanation for this transition.
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INTRODUCTION
Many writers look at Islamic law as immutable, law without
any change or evolution. They perceive Islamic societies as re-
producing themselves without changing. In order to understand
the behavior of Muslims, we should look to the Qu'ran for an
explanation.' This monolithic perspective is not limited to sec-
ondary literature. As stated in a decision of the European Court
of Human Rights: "the Court considers that Shari'a, which faith-
fully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion,
is stable and invariable."2 The principal object of this Article is
to demonstrate that Islamic law, like any system of law, is dy-
namic rather than static. Islamic law cannot be thought of as law
disconnected from history and society. Like any other legal sys-
tem, it is influenced by political, economic and social factors. In
order to illustrate this idea, this Article takes as a case study the
rulings concerning custody of the Shari'a Appeals Court in
* Haifa University, Law Faculty. Dr. Abou Ramadan is currently Emile Noel Fellow
at theJean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law andJustice at
the NYU Law School, New York City. He would like to thank Omar Abou Ramadan,
Khaled Ganaem, Yehiel S. Kaplan, Shifra Kisch, Aharon Layish, Daniel Monterescu,
Tzvika Nissel, Amnon Reichman, Ido Shahar, Abdel Rahman Tayyara for reading previ-
ous drafts of this Article and for making comments. Additionally, Dr. Abou Ramadan
would like to thank the editors and staff of FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL, and
especiallyJulie Turner and her staffJulie Wald, and Inna Nazarova for their efforts and
time in editing this Article. Dr. Abou Ramadan would also like to thank his research
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(2001).
596 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:595
Israel. In Israel, for certain matters, the law recognizes the juris-
diction of different religious courts. Before the adoption of
Amendment No. 5 to the Family Court Law on November 14,
2001,' the Shari'a Appeals Court had exclusive jurisdiction over
matters of alimony, custody, divorce, maintenance, and mar-
riage. After this Amendment, disputes concerning custody
could be adjudicated in either civil or Islamic courts. In Israel,
there are seven Shari'a courts from which there is a right of ap-
peal. These courts serve the Muslim minority in Israel, constitut-
ing around twenty percent of the entire population.4
This Article surveys the rulings of the Shari'a Appeals Court
addressing child custody from 1992 through 2001.' This Arti-
cle's central claim is that the Appeals Court's approach to child
custody underwent a metamorphosis during that period. What
began as a traditional approach, based upon a literal reading of
the Kadri Pasha Code, developed into a reformist approach.
Prior to 1994, the Shari'a courts considered the child's best inter-
ests exclusively because of Israeli law. Subsequently, the courts
Islamized the principle and applied it as a matter of Shari'a law
itself. The Shari'a Appeals Court, however, did not limit the
scope of the reform to the subject of child custody; it was applied
to other subjects as well, including child support, dissolution of
marriage, maintenance for wives, and wills.6
In Part I, I will analyze the essential features of this transi-
tion. This will require an examination of classical Islamic law's
treatment of custody, specifically the Hanafi school's treatment
of it. I will focus on the new interpretation that the Shari'a Ap-
peals Court gave to custody. In Part II, I will offer an explana-
tion for this transition.
I. FROM TRADITION TO REFORM
The rulings of the Shari'a Appeals Court evolved between
3. Family Court Law, 1995, S.H. 1537, as amended by Amendment No. 5 of Nov. 14,
2001, S.H. 1810.
4. See Laurence Louer, Les citoyens arabes d'Israel: Analyse d'une communautarisation
(2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris) (present-
ing a recent study on the Muslim minority in Israel).
5. See AHARON LAYISH, WOMEN AND ISLAMIC LAW IN A NON-MUSLIM STATE: A STUDY
BASED ON DECISIONS OF THE SHAI'A COURTS IN ISRAEL (1975) (providing a systematic
examination of the rulings of the different Shari'a courts, from the reconstitution of the
courts after the establishment of the State of Israel, to the beginning of the 1970s).
6. The author of this Article intends to cover all of these issues in future research.
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1994 and 2001, in a manner indicating a basic and complete re-
vamping of its fundamental conceptions. On a substantive level,
there was a transition from the traditional model to the re-
formed model. The rulings of the Shari'a Appeals Court from
1994 through 2001 are the concrete expression of this transition.
Prior to outlining the cases, and in order to fully appreciate the
nature of the transition and its power, however, I must first deal
briefly with the Hanafi school.
A. Classic Islamic Law Regarding Child Custody with an Emphasis
on the Hanafi School'
In matters of personal status, Israeli religious courts adjudi-
cate in accordance with the personal law of the specific "commu-
nity" to which the litigants belong. For Muslims, Islamic law is
applicable. The primary normative source of Islamic law is the
Qu'ran, which, according to Muslims, is the embodiment of the
Divine word that was revealed in stages to Muhammad by the
Angel Gabriel. The second source is the Sunna of the Prophet
- a record of all of Muhammad's acts and sayings, as well as acts
performed by others that were not opposed by him. The third
source is the Ijma'. This term can be translated as "consensus."
There is no consensus in Sunni legal methodology about whose
consensus is requested. The fourth legal source is Qiyas -
"analogy." In Islamic law, these primary sources are comple-
mented by secondary sources, such as "custom," "general inter-
est," and the istihsan. This is a theoretical description, as it ap-
pears in the book of the methodology of law.8 It is stressed, how-
ever, that these are the formal normative sources of Islamic law,
7. See Y. LINANT DE BELLEFONDS, TRAIT9 DE DROIT MUSULMAN COMPAR9 152-76
(1965) [hereinafter DE BELLEFONDS, TRAITt]; Mahdi Zahraa and Normi A. Malek, The
Concept of Custody in Islamic Law, 155 ARAB LAW QUARTERLY 177 (1998). For Arabic
literature of 20th century scholars, see generally MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRA, AL-AHWAL AL-
SHAKHSIYYA 413-40 (3d ed. 1957); BADRAN ABU AL-'ININ BADRAN, AL-FIQH AL-MUQARIN LL-
AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYVA BAYNA AL-MADHAHIB AL-ARBA'A AL-SUNNIYYA WAL-MADHAB AL-
J'AFARI WAL-QANUN 543-74 (1967); 10 Abd al-Karim Zidan, AI-Mufassal Fi Ahkam al-
Mara' wal-Bait al-Muslim Fi al-Shari'a al-Islamiyya 5-83 (1st ed. 1993) [hereinafter AL-
KARIM ZIDAN]; WAHBIH AL-ZUHAYLI, AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI WA'DILATIH 732-29 (4th ed.,
1997); MAHMUD ALl AL-SARTAWI, SHARH QANUN AL-AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA 559-91 (1997);
AHMAD AL-HAJI AL-KURDI, BUHUTH WAFATAWA FIQHIYYA MUA'ASIRA 104-53 (1999); 2
MUHAMMAD ZID AL-IBIANI, SHARH AL-AHKAM AL-SHARA'vA Fi AL-AHWAL AL-SHAKSYVYA 65-
80 (1911).
8. See MUHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE (revised
ed. 1991); WAHBI AL-ZUHAYLI, USUL AL-FIOH AL-ISLAMI (1986).
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whereas the materially substantive sources of the law are found
primarily in the works of the Islamic jurists, to whom I shall refer
in this Article as "scholars.""
Islam is divided into different streams, the principal division
being between Sunni Islam and Shi'i Islam. Sunni Islam com-
prises four schools, each named after its founder. The Hanafi
school was established by Abu Hanifa; the Maliki school by Malik
b. Anas; the Shafi'i school by Al Shafi'i; and the Hanbali school
by Ahmad b. Hanbal. The schools are divided with respect to
the specific sources of Islamic law, as well as numerous other
subjects.
As stated, the founder of Hanafi was Abu Hanifa, who had
two students: Abu Yusuf and Muhammad. A long line of schol-
ars subsequently interpreted the works of the scholars of the dif-
ferent schools. In order to understand the Classical Law, I will
refer principally to the writings of these scholars, focusing prima-
rily on the Hanafi. Where necessary, I will also refer to scholars
of the other schools. Incidentally, in the Hanafi school there was
additional development, as evidenced in the works of Chafik
Chehata"' and Ya'akov Meron.1 ' The development extended be-
yond the well-known disputes between the founders of the
school. In this Article, however, I shall focus upon the dominant
views.
Under the Ottoman Empire, the Hanafi school was ascen-
dant over the other schools.' 2 Slowly and cautiously, the Otto-
man Sultan initiated a legislative process that climaxed in the
nineteenth century. The legislative process was expressed in the
codification of various fields, although occasionally it meant no
more than the importing of translations of foreign legislation.
9. See DE BELIEFONDS, TRArrf., supra n.7 (discussing the distinction between formal
sources and materially substantive sources).
10. See CHAFIQ CHEHATA, ETuDES DE DROIr MUSULMAN (1971).
I1. See YA'AKOV MERON, L'OBLIGATION ALIMENTAIRE ENTRE EPOUX EN DROIT
MUSULMAN IANtFITE (1971) [hereinafter MERON].
12. SeeJuDr-i E. TUCKER, IN THE HOUSE OF LAw: GENDER AND ISLAMIC LAw IN
OFIT'OMAN SYRIA AND PALESTINE (1998); HENRI LAOUST, LES SCHISMS DANS L'ISLAM: INTRO-
DUCIrION A UNE ITUDE DE LA RELIGION MUSULMANE 311 (1965); MUHAMMAD AL-ZUHAYLI,
TARIKH AL-QADA', FI AL-ISLAM 448 (1st ed. 1995). While the Hanafi school had an offi-
cial status, in the large towns the Ottomans customarily appointed Qadis belonging to
the other three traditions. This custom was initiated by the Mamluk Sultan Bifris in
1265. SeeJoseph H. Escovitz, Patterns of Appointment to the ChiefJudgeships of Cairo Duing
the Bahri Mamluk Period, XXX ARABIC, TOME 147-68 (1983).
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Thus, the Swiss Code was translated, and it influenced the civil
procedure. Another aspect of the codification was the codifica-
tion of Islamic law, as interpreted by the Hanafi, the Mejelle being
the most prominent example. It was only in 1917 that matters of
personal status were partially codified.1 3 While this legislation
relied primarily upon the Hanafi tradition, it also absorbed ele-
ments from other traditions, using the legal tool of talfik. 4
The process of codification, however, was partial; many ar-
eas were ignored, among them child custody, child support, in-
heritance, and lineage. Theoretically speaking, in these areas
the Shari'a courts were supposed to continue relying upon the
classical books of Hanafi fiqh. Nonetheless, quite rapidly, a new
custom of using the Kadri Pasha Code emerged. 5 This Code
regulates personal status in Islamic law according to the Hanafi
school. The codification committee relied principally upon Ibn
'Abdin, the Mufti" in Damascus, who was regarded as one of the
last great Hanafi scholars. Use of the Code increased, despite its
lack of official legislative force. The Egyptian government
avoided giving the Code legislative status for fear of creating a
perception of infringing on Shari'a jurisdiction."7 Aharon Layish
attributes the use of the Code in Israel to the fact that some of
the Qadis'8 in Israel, prior to the establishment of the State of
Israel, studied in al-Azhar in Egypt, from where they brought the
Code. 1"
13. See S. GUrvrEIN & A. BEN SHUSHAN, ISLAMIC LAW IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL (1957)
(discussing the translation of the law and the explanatory notes). See also Judith E.
Tucker, Revisiting Reform: Women and the Ottoman Law of Family Rights, 1917, 4(2) ARAB
STUDIESJ. 4, 4-17 (1996).
14. Talfik is a technique used by the Islamic legislature in order to institute reform
in Islamic law by way of reliance on more than one tradition. See NORMAN ANDERSON,
LAW REFORM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 47-58 (1976) (providing examples of this tech-
nique in practice).
15. See MUI-AMMAD ZID AL-IBIANI, supra n.2.
16. A "Mufti" is a Muslim scholar who gives legal opinion.
17. Y. Linant de Bellefonds, Immutabiliti de Droit musulman et reformes ligislatives en
Egypte, in REVUE INTENATIONALE DE DROIT COMPAR" 5-34 (esp. 12-13) (1953) [hereinaf-
ter de Bellefonds, Immutabilitg].
18. In the context of this Article, the term "Qadi" is used to mean a judge in an
Islamic court.
19. Aharon Layish, The Qadis and the Shari'a in Israel, in THE ULEMA AND RELIGIOUS
PROBLEMS IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD 294-315 (G. Bach ed., 1971).
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1. Definition of the Hadana
"Hadana" is defined by the Hanafi as "caring for the child,
ensuring the fulfillment of his needs in all areas at a certain age,
by a person who has the right of hadana.''20 Hadana purported
to moderate paternal power in a system that was essentially pa-
ternalistic.2' Some scholars view hadana as being a component
of wilaya, or guardianship.22
The uniqueness of hadana lies in its attitude towards wo-
men.23 The question of hadana only arises after divorce, at least
in the opinion of al-Sarakhsi. 24 Accordingly, the chapter ad-
dressing hadana is part of the law that applies to the child upon
dissolution of the marriage. Al-Kasani, on the other hand, did
not view hadana as beginning with the dissolution of the mar-
riage.25 The two views, however, can be reconciled. On a practi-
cal level, hadana becomes relevant only after the dissolution of
the marriage.
2. Conditions for Custodianship Legal Capacity:
Majority and Sanity
In order to qualify for hadana, a person must have reached
the age of majority. A minor lacks the legal capacity to receive
hadana, for he is unable to guard and take care of himself. Eligi-
bility for hadana is further contingent upon sanity. Conse-
quently, an insane person cannot become a custodian of chil-
dren. The two reasons have a shared rationale: in order to take
care of another, the entitled person must first prove his ability to
take care of himself.26
a. Freedom
Entitlement to hadana is dependent upon the person being
20. 14 IRN NUJAYM, AL-BAHR AL-RA'IQ 179 (1997) [hereinafter IBN NUJAYM]. See gen-
erally 3 IBN 'ABDIN, HASHAT RADD AL-MUHTAR (1960) [hereinafter IBN 'ABDIN].
21. DE BELLFONDS, TRAITt, supra n.7.
22. IBN NUJAYM, supra n.20, at 182; 5 AL-SARAKHSI, AL-MABSUT, 207 (4th ed. 1976-
1980) [hereinafter AL-SARAKHSI].
23. 4 AL-KASANI, BADAT' AL-SANA'I' 41 (1974).
24. AL-SARAKHSI, supra n.22, at 207.
25. AL-KASANI, supra n.23, at 4045.
26. 2 IBN 'ABDIN, HASHIYAT RADD AL-MUHTAR 871-72 (1960) [hereinafter IBN
'ABDIN].
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free. Classical Islamic law recognizes slavery.27 According to
some scholars, hadana is an integral part of wilayah, and a slave
cannot be a guardian. Furthermore, a maidservant is inevitably
occupied with service of her master and lacks the requisite time
to care for a child. This is the opinion of the Hanafi, Hanbali,
and Shafi'i schools. According to the Maliki school, the right of
hadana is given to the mother and to the maidservant whose
child is free.
2 1
b. Physical Capacity
The child's custodian must have physical strength. In the
event of physical incapacitation, he is not entitled to hadana.29
c. Religion
Receiving hadana is not contingent upon being a Muslim.
Conceptually, hadana is rooted in compassion. Thus, even if the
mother belongs to the Dhimmi,3° she is entitled to keep the
child.3" This, however, is not the case regarding a person who
was a Muslim and left the religion, for a woman apostate would
be imprisoned until her return to Islam. No school other than
the Shafi'i requires that the mother pray as a condition to her
entitlement to hadana.
3 2
d. Special Conditions for Women
In addition to the conditions stipulated above, the blood
27. Books on Islamic law deal extensively with the status of the slave. Today, how-
ever, most of the Islamic States have abolished the institution of slavery. See Sami A.
Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, La definition internationale des Droits de l'homme et l'Islam, R.G.DI.P.
625, 625-706 (1985). An attempt was also made to abolish the institution of slavery by
having resort to one of the Islamic sources of law, ijma'"
28. 4 AL-HAl lAB, MAWAHIB, AL-JALIL LI-SHARH MUKHTASAR KHALIL 214-15 (1969); DE
BELLEFONDS, TRAITE, supra n.7, at 163. Section 98 of the Moroccan law is derived prima-
rily on the Malikis, and it enumerates the conditions that a custodian must satisfy. Be-
ing a free man is not one of the conditions.
29. HAZIM AHMAD MUHAMMAD, DHIYAB, AHKAM AL-HADANA FI AL-SHARI'A AL-IS-
LAMIYYA 73 (unpublished Masters Graduate Thesis in Islamic Law and Constitution,
University of al-Najah) (1995).
30. In order to receive the status of Dhimmi, it is necessary to pay a tax, known as
"jizya." This tax, however, is not accepted from every group. See WAHBIH AL-ZUHAYLI,
ATHAR AL-HARB F1 AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI: DIRAsA MUQARINA 712-27 (4th ed. 1992) (defining
Dhimi).
31. AL-KASANI, supra n.23, at 42; IBN NUjAyM, supra n.22, at 185.
32. IBN NUIAYM, supra n.22, at 181.
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connection of the woman must preclude her marriage to an-
other man. Most scholars find that if a woman marries another
man, she is unable to continue her custodianship of the child
and forfeits her entitlement to hadana. This view is disputed by
Ibn Hazm of the Zahiri school, which finds that a woman's mar-
riage to another man does not remove her claim to hadana.33
This rule is based upon the hadith of the Prophet, according
to which a woman complained to the Prophet that her husband
wanted to take her child away from her. The Prophet responded
to her: "You have more right to him so long as you do not
marry." Scholars understood this prohibition to apply only to
marriage to an "alien" man, i.e., a stranger. The prohibition de-
rives from the fear that the stranger will not take care of the
child. The man is "alien" in the sense that there is no rule for-
bidding him to marry the child. On the other hand, if the wo-
man were to marry the child's uncle, she would not forfeit her
entitlement to custody of the child. 4
This law is given the following expression by al-Sarkhasi,
who states that:
[i]f the mother marries another man, the father can take the
child away from her, for the Prophet of blessed memory said
'for as long as you do not marry' - hence the right of cus-
tody is until she marries . . . for if she marries she will be
occupied in taking care of her husband and will have no time
to educate the child, and the child will generally live in diffi-
cult and humiliating conditions due to the woman's husband;
the father can therefore withhold agreement and remove the
child from her. 3 5
3. Duration of Hadana
Hadana is only granted for a limited period. Upon its expi-
ration, the son or daughter is transferred to paternal custody.
Different ages for the custody transfer were established for sons
and daughters.
The son goes to his father when he no longer depends on
female help, which is when he both eats and purifies himself
33. Ibn Hazm, 11 AL-MUHALLA 742, 745 (1970).
34. AL-KARIM ZIDAN, supra n.7, at 44; AL-KASANI, sufa n.23, at 42.
35. See AL-SARAKHSI, supra n.22, at 210; IBN NUJAYM, supra n.22, at 183-85; IBN AL-
HUMAM, FATH AL-QADIR 317 (1987) [hereinafter IBN AL-HUMAM].
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independently. Generally speaking, the Hanafi ruled that the
age for the boy was seven, based upon the hadith that male
prayer is obligatory from the age of seven. In order to be able to
pray, however, he must also purify himself - the assumption
being that at seven he is able to purify himself independently,
meaning that he is in control of his personal hygiene. After this
age, the boy is transferred to paternal custody. The fear behind
this rule was that the boy's continued presence with a woman
would imbue him with feminine attributes of soft and delicate
speech, which would lead to him being considered inhibited.
Furthermore, when the son becomes seven, the father begins ed-
ucating and teaching him.
This was not the logic used to justify the daughter's transfer
to paternal custody when she was no longer needed to perform
domestic duties. The scholars ruled that a daughter must learn
how to cook and knit, but upon reaching the age at which she
could entice others, she should be transferred to paternal cus-
tody to ensure her continued protection.3" Thus, Section 391 of
the Kadri Pasha Code mandates maternal custody of the daugh-
ter until the age of nine and of the son until the age of seven.
4. Order of Those Entitled to Child Custody
In the case of the mother's death, or in the event that she
no longer satisfies any one of the threshold conditions for
hadana, the scholars offered a long list of people who were sup-
posed to replace her. Women related to the mother were pre-
ferred and the men were next in line.
The first on the list came from the maternal side. Hanafi
scholars based this ruling on the hadith of the Prophet:
A women said: messenger of God: my stomach was the shel-
ter for my son, my breasts his drink and my garment his shel-
ter. His father divorced me and wants to take him away from
me. The [P]rophet of blessed memory said: your right
prevails over his right, for as long as you have not married.37
The preference for the mother was also prescribed in the
dictum of the first Calif, Abu Bakar, who was known as "the right-
eous one." After Omar (who thereafter became the second Ca-
li) divorced his wife, she complained about him to the Calif,
36. See AL-SARKIJASI, sufpra n.22, at 206-07.
37. Quoted in AL-KARIM ZIDAN, supra n.7.
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who subsequently conveyed to Omar that his wife's spittle was
preferable to his honey.
The scholars explained the mother's preferred status as de-
rived from the nature of hadana, which is based upon compas-
sion, for by nature, the mother is more merciful. In her ab-
sence, or if she failed to satisfy the conditions for hadana, her
mother was next in line as the person most closely related to the
mother. Following the grandmother, there was a long list of wo-
men, graded according to their genealogical proximity to the
mother. In the Hanafi, a number of views exist regarding the
order of entitled women and the codifier of Kadri Pasha states
his own order of preference in Sections 384-86.
5. The Child's Will in the Hadana
The Hanafi did not consider the minor's wishes regarding
the custodian's identity as a relevant factor for determination of
custody. AI-Kasani's explanation for the disregard of the minor's
wishes is that children generally prefer to play than to be serious
and will therefore tend to choose the worst of the two parents
(the more lenient one)." The Shaft'i on the other hand, con-
tend that after the "age of discernment" (which is normally
viewed as seven years of age) the child is allowed to choose. This
view is based on the hadith of the Prophet in which he allows the
child to choose between his two parents. Al-Sarkhasi contests
the reliance upon this hadith, which, he argues, is not applicable
because the Prophet was praying for that particular child and he
had made the correct choice. 9
6. The Nature of the Hadana
With respect to the Hanafi school, it is unclear whether the
right is the child's or the mother's. Hanafi scholars generally
rule that the right simultaneously belongs to the mother and the
child. The importance of this distinction is expressed in the dif-
ferent laws determined therewith. If the right belongs to the
child, the mother is unable to waive it in the event of consensual
divorce. On the other hand, if the right belongs to the mother,
she can waive the right because she is under no obligation to be
38. AL-KASANI, supra n.23, at 42.
39. AL-SARKHASl, supra n.22, at 208; IBN AL-HUMAM, supra n.35, at 318.
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the minor's guardian.4"
a. Child Support Payments
Scholars examine a number of different situations regard-
ing the mother's entitlement to payment. During the marriage
itself, or the time when the mother is in a waiting period, if there
is a revocable divorce, she is not entitled to a separate payment
for being the custodian, since at all events, she is entitled to
maintenance payments from the father. Following divorce,
scholars distinguish between cases in which there is a female vol-
unteer for custody over the child and ones where there is no
such volunteer.4'
Where there is no volunteer, there are four distinct pos-
sibilities:
(1) rich father and poor child: the father is obligated to
pay a fee for the mother's custodianship;
(2) poor father and rich child: the fee will be withdrawn
from the child's money;
(3) rich father and rich child: the fee will be withdrawn
from the child's money; or
(4) poor father and poor child: the mother is obligated to
educate the child and her fee becomes her ex-hus-
band's debt, payable by him when he becomes rich.
When there is a female volunteer:
(1) rich father and poor child: the mother receives custody
of the child and will receive appropriate payment;
(2) poor father and rich child: the mother can choose be-
tween custody without remuneration or giving the child
to the volunteer;
(3) rich father and rich child: the mother can choose be-
tween custody without remuneration or giving the child
to the volunteer; or
(4) poor father and poor child: the mother is requested to
raise the child for free, or to give the child to the volun-
teer.
Classical Islamic law establishes a detailed system of norms
regarding the qualifying conditions for child custody and trans-
40. IBN NUjAyM, supra n.22, at 180.
41. IBN 'ABIDIN, supra n.20, at 560-62; 2 AL-IBIANI, SHARH AL-ANWAL AL-SHAKHSfYVA
73-77 (1920).
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fer of the child from the mother to the father. The institution of
hadana and the particulars of custody allocation are obviously
designed for the child's protection. Al-Kasani, for example, re-
fers to the child's interests.42 In referring to the child's interests,
however, the intention is not to exclusively serve the child's in-
terests. Rather, the concept purports to preserve a particular tra-
dition of role division between the two sexes, with a view towards
preparing members of each gender for their own gender-based
vocations. Furthermore, importance also attaches to the relig-
ion of the custodian, his social status (whether he is free or a
slave), and his moral standing in accordance with the standards
of an Islamic society. This Article observes that the Shari'a Ap-
peals Court altered the normative standing of the child's best
interests. From being one factor to be considered among a plu-
rality of considerations, the best interests of the child became
the dominant and exclusive consideration in matters of child
custody."
B. The New Reading of the Shari'a Appeals Court: The Theory
of Presumptions
The Shari'a Appeals Court came a long way in its transition
from the classical format to the reformed one. Methodologi-
cally, having accepted the basic principle of the child's best in-
terests as the controlling principle in child custody, the Appeals
Court proceeded to interpret the classical rules governing child
custody as a system of presumptions, all intended to maintain
the child's best interests. The sub-text of the child's best inter-
ests inherent in these presumptions, therefore, becomes a prin-
ciple guiding judicial discretion, allowing flexibility if the judge
determines that a child's best interests are incompatible with the
positive law. The Shari'a Appeals Court's use of this technique is
strikingly similar to proposals of Pinchas Shifman,44 who, with
respect to Jewish law governing child custody, wrote:
If the presumption of Jewish law - by which the best inter-
ests of the boy over six dictate paternal custody, and for girls,
42. AL-KASANI, supra n.23, at 60.
43. See DINA CHARIF FELLER, LA GARDE (HADANAH) EN DROIT MUSULMAN ET DANS LES
DRorrs EGYP'IEN, SYRIEN ET TUNISIEN 60-80 (Droz 1996) [hereinafter FELLER].
44. Pinchas Shifman, The Child's Best Interest in the Rabbinical Court, 5 MISHPATIM
421, 421-30 (1974). See also E. Shochetman, The Nature of the Halachic Rules Governing
the Subject of Child Custody, 5 SHENXrION HAMISHPAT-i HAIvRI 285, 285-320 (1978).
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maternal custody - was a rigid one, which could not be devi-
ated from, it could be claimed, justly, that it conflicted with
the judge's obligation to apply his discretion regarding the
welfare of the child, having consideration for the particular
facts of each case. In reality, however, Jewish law does not
establish such rigid, binding presumptions. Quite the oppo-
site-where the child's interests demonstrably indicate a par-
ticular parent as being the preferred custodian, the judge will
not hesitate to rule in accordance with the presented evi-
dence. Generally speaking, the judge will be guided by a pre-
sumption as to the best interests of the child in view of such
evidence. The judge's presumption as to the best interests of
the child will be the controlling factor in the decision, as long
as there is no clear conflicting evidence regarding what his
45best interests are...
1. Analysis of the New Rules Regarding Child Custody
In this section, I will first analyze the principle of the child's
best interests; then, I will examine the use of the presumptions
regarding the Classical rules.
a. The Principle of the Child's Best Interests
In this sub-section I will examine the recognition of the
principle of the child's best interests; the inaccuracy of the
Shari'a Appeals Court's ruling on the non-applicability of the le-
gal capacity and guardianship law; the Islamization of the princi-
ple of the child's best interests; the principle of the child's best
interests as infringing upon Islamic rules of evidence; and the
effect of the principle of the best interests of the child on the
distinction between the different schools of law.
i. Recognition of the Principle of the Child's Best Interests
The principle of the child's best interests is enshrined in
international law in the Convention on the Rights of the Child
in Sections 3(1), 9(1), 9(3), 18(1), 21, 37(c), and 40(2) (iii); 46 in
45. Shifman, supra n.44, at 426-27.
46. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448
(1989) with corrections at 29 I.L.M. 1340 (1990). See also SHARON DETRICK, A COMMEN-
TARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 9-85 (1999)
(analyzing the child's best interests principle in the Convention on the Rights of the
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Section 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW");47 and in Sections
16 and 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR") ,48 according to the interpretation of the Hu-
man Rights Committee. 49 Israel expressed reservations regard-
ing Section 16 of CEDAW,50 as well as Section 23 of the ICCPR.5 1
There are no such reservations, however, regarding Section 24
of the ICCPR.
While some Arab States have recognized this principle in
certain cases, it is certainly not universally applicable to the en-
tire subject of child custody.52 It does not constitute a "funda-
mental principle" as it does in the French law, or even in Israeli
law. Some Arab States attach greater importance than others to
Child); Philip Alston, The Best Interest Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and
Human Rights, 8 INT'LJ.L. & FAMILY 1, 1-25 (1994).
47. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 21, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180
(Sept 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW].
48. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (xxi),
999 U.N.T.S. at 171 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
49. The ICCPR only mentions the principle of the child's best interests within the
context of Sections 23 and 24, which deal with the child's protection. In its Comments
on Section 24(1) of this convention, the Human Rights Committee stated that "[i]f the
marriage is dissolved, steps should be taken, keeping in view the paramount interest of
children, to give them necessary protection and, so far as is possible, to guarantee per-
sonal relations with both parents." Human Rights Committee, General Comment 17
(35th Sess., 1989), reproduced in COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL REC-
OMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/I/
Rev. 5, 22-24, para. 6 (2001).
50. "Israel registers its reservation regarding section 16 of the Convention, to the
extent that the laws of personal status which bind the religious communities in Israel do
not cohere with the provisions of that Section." CEDAW was adopted on December 18,
1979, and became effective in Israel on November 2, 1991. K.A. 1033, 31, 181, 197.
51. "Having consideration for Section 34 [sic. The correct citation should be to
Sec. 24] of the Convention and any of its other provisions regarding which this current
qualification may be relevant, personal status matters in Israel are subordinate to the
religious law of the affected parties and in the event of such a law not being consistent
with its undertakings under the Convention, Israel reserves the right to apply the law."
K.A. 1040, 31, 270, 295.
52. See FELLER, supra n.43, at 60-80. See also FATIMA AGHA & AL-HAYANI, LEGAL MOD-
ERNISM IN IRAQ: A STUDY OF AMENDMENTS TO FAMILY LAW (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, U.Mich.); MUHAMMAD CHAFI, 'CODE DU STATUT PERSONNEL ANNOTE (TEXTES LEGIS-
LATIFS, DOCTRINE ET JURISPRUDENCE) (1996); LYNN WELCHMAN, ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW,
TEXT AND PRACTICE IN PALESTINE 203-20 (1999); AHMAD NASER AL-JUNDI, AL-Ta'liq 'ala
al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya (1998); MAHMUD 'ALl AL-SARTAWI, SHARH QANUN AL-AHWAL AL-
SHAKHISIYYA AL-URDUNI (1997); AI-IMAD SALIM MELHIM, AL-SHARH AL-TATBIQI LIQANUN AL-
AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA AL-URDUNI (1998).
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the child's best interests, but even then, it does not constitute an
exclusive interest. For example, Section' 109 Of the Moroccan
Family Law provides that the child shall remain with his legal
custodian, unless the Qadi himself finds that the child's best in-
terests dictate otherwise. 3 Section 166 of Law No.61 of Personal
Status in Jordan provides that a person with whom the child is
staying cannot leave the Kingdom with the child, unless the
guardian agrees, subject to the prior assurance of his welfare.54
Under Section 157 of the Jordanian Personal Status Law, in the
event of there being more than one candidate for custody, all
sharing the same degree of entitlement, the Qadi is entitled to
choose between the various candidates in accordance with the
child's best interests. Under Section 164, the custodian of the
child may travel within theJordanian Kingdom for as long as this
does not conflict with the child's interests. Consequently, under
Jordanian Law, the principle of the best interests of the child is
recognized only in very specific statutorily-defined cases.
Neither the legal literature addressing the interpretation of the
law, nor the Jordanian case law on child custody, place any par-
ticular emphasis on this principle.55
The Algerian Family Law of 1984 discusses, in Sections 62-
72, the issue of child custody.56 Section 64 lists the persons who
are entitled to the custody of the child and directs these custodi-
ans to ensure the child's best interests. Under Section 65, when
ajudge terminates the period of hadana, he takes the child's best
interests into account. Section 66 permits the custodian to waive
custodial rights, provided that it does not endanger the interests
of the child in custody. Where a judge terminates the hadana
entitlement of a person who does not satisfy the legal require-
53. See ABD AL-AzIz TAWFIQ, THE FAMILY LAW WITH ITS RECENT AMENDMENTS -
DAHIR 10/9/1993 (1997).
54. See 2 AHMAD MUHAMMAD, 'ALl DAHUD, AL-QARARAT AL-ISTI'NAFIYYA F1 AL-AHWAL
AL-SHAKHSIYYA 1423 (1999).
55. See Lynn Welchman, The Development of Islamic Family Law in the Legal System of
Jordan, 37 I.C.L.O. 865, 877-78 (1988); OMAR SLIMAN AL-ASHKAR, AL-WADIH Fi SHARH
QANUN AL-AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIWA AL-URDUNI 291-302 (1997). In Jordanian case law, the
child's best interests are an important consideration when a Qadi rules on matters of
child custody, but they are not the paramount consideration, and do not constitute nor
have the status of the basic principle. See I AHMAD MUHAMMAD, 'ALl DAHUD, AL-
QARARAT AL-ISTI'NAFIYA F1 AL-AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA 497-585 (1999) (referencing the
best interests of the child principle in Jordanian case law from 1951 to 1999).
56. See Leila Hamdan, Les difficultes de codification du droit de la famille algerien, 37
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 1001-15 (1985).
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ments, he must also consider the child's best interests under Sec-
tion 67. In most of its provisions, the Algerian law makes the law
regarding child custody contingent upon the child's best inter-
ests. In the absence of a general provision relating exclusively to
the child's best interests, however, it cannot be regarded as a
fundamental principle in the normative sense. Furthermore,
Section 66 provides that when a woman marries a man who is
permitted to marry the minor, she loses her entitlement to
hadana. Algerian law does not even give consideration to the
recognized exceptions in Islamic law for cases in which there is
no custodian, there is a claim against the woman, or the subse-
quent custodian does not satisfy the requirements for receiving
custody of the child.
In domestic Israeli law, the principle of the child's best in-
terests has received legislative recognition.5" In addition to spe-
cific legislation, the principle of the child's best interests also has
the status of a fundamental principle, above and beyond specific
legal provisions. Its autonomous status derives from its applica-
tion in numerous pieces of legislation. The technique of estab-
lishing the general, independent status of a principle on the ba-
sis of its frequent legislative application allowed Cheshin J. to
establish the principle of civil paternity due to its application in a
series of laws."' Similarly, a general principle of affirmative ac-
tion was derived from a series of laws, which applied the princi-
ple of affirmative action for women."' This does not mean that
the principle of the child's best interests constitutes an extra-le-
gal principle, but rather, that it is a controlling judicial norm.
The principle of the child's best interests has been cited in
numerous judgments.6 It must be mentioned that the compet-
57. See 32 A'RAB IBILQACIM, MUSQITAT ALHAQ LILHADANA Fl AL-QANUN AL-JAZA'IRI WA-
ALFIQIH AL-ISLAMI, REVUE ALGERIENNE I)ES SCIENCES JURIDIQUES, ECONOMIQUES ET POITI-
QUES 139-50, 145-46 (1994).
58. See Women's Equality of Rights Law, 1951, S.H. 82, Sec. 3(b); Capacity and
Guardianship Law, 1962 S.H. 380, Secs. 17, 25; Adoption of Children Law, 1981, S.H.
1028, Sec. 1 (b); Welfare Law (Procedure in Matters of Minors, Minors, Mentally Ill and
Absentees Persons), 1955 S.H. 187, Sec. 8; Youth Law (Trial, Punishment and Modes of
Treatment), 1971 S.H. 629, Secs. 18(a), 20(a), 33; Prevention of Domestic Violence
Law, 1991 S.H. 1352, Secs. 2 (g), 4.
59. See C.A. 90/3077, Anon v. Anon, 49(2) P.D. 578.
60. See H.C. 2671/98, Israeli Women's Lobby v. Minister of Labour and Welfare,
52(3) P.D. 630.
61. See, e.g., Yehiel S. Kaplan, The Interpretation of the Concept 'The Best Interest of the
Child' in Israel, in CHILDREN RIGHTS AND TRADITIONAL VALUES 47-85 (Gillian Douglas &
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Lesslie Sebba eds., 1998); Shifinan, supra n.44; Avner Chai Shaki, Features of the Laws of
Custody, with Emphasis on Implementation of the Principle of the Best Interests of the Child,
10(1) lynei Mishpat 5, 5-35 (1984); SAADA SHMUEL, CHILDREN'S CUSTODY 47-52 (1992);
L.C.A. 7994/98, T.D. v. S.D., 53(3) P.D. 270, 270-71. The decision states:
The principle of the child's best interests is an important, central value in all
[S]tates who are sides to the Convention, and there can be no discussion of
matters concerning minors without consideration of their interests. Conse-
quently, even if the principle of the child's best interests is not independently
recognized in the Hague Convention, it is no doubt a principle that was taken
into account when considering the interests receiving expression in the Con-
vention.
Id. See also H.C. 5227/97, Michal David v. Rabbinical Court of Appeal, TK-EI(3) 443,
446 (stating that "[T]he principle of the child's best interests or alternatively, the
child's rights, is universally accepted as the mega principle. The question only relates to
what constitutes those interests and what constitutes the content of that right."); C.A.
2266/93, Anon v. Anon, 49(1) P.D. 221, 250-51. The decision states:
It seems that the importance of 'the child's best interests' cannot be over-
stated. This principle has long been recognized as a guiding principle in the
resolution of family-law related disputes, e.g., abrogation of parental rights,
kidnapping of children, and custody disputes. In each of the fields, the princi-
ple receives a slightly different emphasis. The issue before us bears a close
resemblance to custody disputes between parents. The principle receives its
statutory expression in the Capacity and Guardianship Law as well as in the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child (Sec. 3).
Id. It also states:
Ultimately, while I am unable to accept the bifurcation of custody into 'physi-
cal custody' and 'spiritual custody,' I can accept that the subjects contem-
plated by the term 'custody' are separable in the sense that, at a practical level,
certain areas may be allocated to each parent, subject to the principle of 'the
child's best interests,' which, in my view, is and always was the guiding princi-
ple, constituting the appropriate deciding mechanism in the issue before us.
The implementation of this principle involves exercising judicial discretion in
balancing between the interests of the minor and his parents -jointly and
separately. Each of these interests is examined and assessed through the
prism of the best interests of the child. The undisputed supremacy of this
principle amongst enlightened States in matters concerning minors, indicates
its centrality in modern society.
Id. at 276-77. The decision further states: "Should there be any need to take a side in
this dispute, which in my mind is not of vast importance, I would take the view, in
concurrence with Justice Strasbourg Cohen, that the child's best interests also include
the rights of the child." Id. at 279-80; C.A. 4616/94, Att'y Gen. v. Anon, 48(4) P.D. 298,
307-08 (Strasbourg Cohen J.) (remarking that "[T]he subject is a particularly sensitive
one, involving a child and adoptive parents, each of whom has interests, between which
a balance must be struck, the supreme value being the child's best interests."); C.A.
5942/92, Anon v. Anon, 48(3) P.D. 837, 843-44 (remarking that "[f]urthermore, the
appropriate regard for the child's best interests is one of the expressions of human
dignity .. ."); C.A. 473/93 Tali Leibovitz v. Michael Leibovitz, 47(3) P.D. 63, 81-82
(noting: " [E]ven so, and we except this principle too, the Court will have regard for the
circumstances of the particular case before us, in accordance with the supreme princi-
ple of the child's best interests."); H.C. 1985/91, Ruti Kagan v. Rabbinic Court of Ap-
peal, Tk-EI 92 (3), 1130, 1130 (noting that "[T] he guiding principle in custody disputes
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ing doctrine of the "rights of the child" also occupies a place in
the case law, but has yet to become the dominant doctrine. 62
In most of its judgments, the Shari'a Appeals Court recog-
nized the child's best interests as being a guiding principle in all
cases of child custody. The Court systematically referred to the
doctrine, making it an integral part of all judgments dealing with
hadana, sometimes calling it "the basic consideration."6" In rec-
ognizing and applying the principle of the child's best interests,
however, the Court was careful to note that its application was
not by force of the Capacity and Guardianship Law ("Capacity
Law"), but rather, by virtue of the Islamic law.64 This constitutes
a double-edged judicial strategy. On the one hand, the Court
proclaimed its independence from positive Israeli law as ex-
pressed in the Capacity Law, but on the other hand, it "Islam-
ized" the principle of the best interests of the child.
ii. The Inaccuracy of Shari'a Appeals Court's Rulings
Regarding the Non-Applicability of the Capacity and
Guardianship Law
In many of its judgments, the Court ruled that the Capacity
Law does not apply to the Shari'a Courts and that they are not
bound by its provisions. Qadi Zoebi explained the non-applica-
bility of the law to Shari'a Courts in the following manner:
I have no choice but to state that while the Court may have
been correct in its decision, which relied upon Section 25 of
the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, nonetheless, the
Shari'a Court operates in accordance with the rules of the
Shari'a, which are derived from the Shari'a, as revealed to the
Prophet of God. The Shari'a is complete, general, compre-
hensive, and valid at all times and places. The Shari'a Courts
were established to adjudicate claims and disputes in accor-
dance with the Shari'a and not in accordance with the positive
law. How is this possible? Are we permitted to apply positive
law, when our Shari'a is complete and abounds with Shari'a
between parents is the principle of the child's best interests."); L.C.A. 4250/90 Anon v.
Attorney General Tk-E1 90(3) 1089, 1091 (remarking: "[B]ut in the final analysis, the
child's best interests prevail over any other consideration.").
62. See Yehiel S. Kaplan, From the Child's Interests to the Child's Rights: Independent
Representation for Minors, 31 MISHPATIM 623 (2001).
63. See A. 15/98 (Feb. 16, 1998); A. 56/99 (Apr. 27, 1999); C. 254/98 (Oct. 10,
1998); A. 63/94 (Oct. 13, 1994); A. 48/94 (Jan. 16, 1994); C. 31/96 (Apr. 17, 1996).
64. See Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962, S.H. 380 [hereinafter Capacity Law].
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texts applying to all the subjects relating to people ('Ibad). A
fortiori this is the case when Section 79 of the Capacity Law
declares that it does not add to or derogate from the powers
of the religious courts ... The result is, therefore, that when
the Court gave itsjudgment, it ought to have relied upon the
Shari'a texts, which should be the basis for its rulings, and it
should not have relied upon the Capacity and Guardianship
Law... 6 5
Section 79 of the Capacity Law deals with jurisdiction and
states that the court with jurisdiction shall retain its jurisdiction.
For example, the Rabbinical Courts and the Courts of the Chris-
tian Communities have parallel jurisdiction and they retain their
parallel jurisdiction following the adoption of the Law. The
same applies to the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the
Qadis in the religious courts. To illustrate, after the adoption of
the Capacity Law, the other Courts retained their exclusive juris-
diction.66 Even so, Sections 24 and 25, which refer to the best
interests of the child, are substantive and not procedural, and
there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the distinction be-
tween procedure and substance.
Another attempt to explain the non-application of the Ca-
pacity Law was made by Qadi Natur in judgment 135/96, where
he wrote: "I want to make it clear that a religious court is not
obliged to apply the provisions of the Capacity and Guardian-
ship Law, because the Law, unlike the Women's Equal Rights
Law of 1951, makes no specific reference to the Qadi Court." In
the earlier rulings of the Shari'a Appeals Court, however, refer-
ence is made to the Capacity Law.67 Consequently, the claim
that Shari'a recognizes the principle of the child's best interests
was only made during the last six years, even though the Shari'a
predates the establishment of the Court of Appeals. Until ap-
proximately six years ago, the Shari'a courts generally mentioned
their compliance with the Capacity Law when justifying decisions
that were based on the child's best interests.
The Shari'a Appeals Court's central mistake lies in its failure
to acknowledge the ruling of the High Court of Justice. Ajudg-
65. A. 127/97 (Nov. 24, 1997).
66. This rule existed before the reform by the Knesset of the Family Courts
(Amendment No. 5) Law, 2001, S.H. 1810.
67. See, e.g., A. 27/92 (Sept. 13, 1992). See also A. 30/95 (Mar. 10, 1995). In these
cases, the Shari'a Appeals Court relied upon Sections 24 and 25 of the Capacity Law.
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ment on this issue was recently published in Michal David v. the
Rabbinical Court of Appeal in Jerusalem. Cheshin J. wrote:
Our concern here is with one of the basic rules that has devel-
oped in case law. Accordingly, the High Court of Justice will
interfere with the judgments of a religious court in cases
where the decisions conflict with a statutory provision ad-
dressed by the religious courts, deviate therefrom, or ignore
it. See e.g. the Levigrund and Yehudit Levi cases cited above and
the references cited. Additionally, there are those who clas-
sify this actionable cause as being ultra vires ...
Paragraph 10 of the judgment reads:
[t]he statutory provisions for our purposes appear in the Ca-
pacity and Guardianship Law of 1962. The Capacity Law
deals with parent-children relations in a number of provi-
sions, and, as we well know, the guiding principle in these
relations is the minor's best interests. In the words of Section
17 of the Capacity Law: "In the exercise of their guardian-
ship, the parents shall act in the best interests of the minor in
such manner as devoted parents would act under the circum-
stances."6 9
It is commonplace that guardianship includes the obliga-
tion and the right to ensure the provision of the child's needs,
including his education (Sections 15 and 38 of the Capacity
Law). The Court is bound by the same obligation to act in the
best interests of the minor whose case comes before it. In the
words of Section 25 of the Capacity Law: "The Court may deter-
mine the matters referred to in Section 24 as may appear to it to
be in the best interests of the minor. '7  These provisions are
supplemented by Section 79 of the Capacity Law, which states
that "[w]here a religious court is competent by law, any provi-
sion of this Law which refers to a court - except Section 75 -
shall be deemed to refer to a religious court."' 7 1 Regarding this
provision it was mentioned in the Levigrund case that:
Section 25 [of the Capacity Law] is directly applicable to the
religious courts. In other words, the religious courts should
and must rule in accordance therewith, and the controlling
consideration must be the best interests of the minor. The
68. H.C. 5227/97 (1998).
69. See, e.g., A. 27/92 (Sept. 13, 1992). See also A. 30/95 (Mar. 10, 1995).
70. Capacity Law, supra n.64, Sec. 24.
71. Id. Sec. 79.
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High Court of Justice must and will intervene when a relig-
ious court fails to rule in compliance with its duty, namely, in
accordance with the best interests of the minor, preferring
other considerations that are not necessarily consistent with
the child's best interests.72
It is clear that the Shari'a Appeals Court's statement that the
Capacity Law did not apply to it was inaccurate. Furthermore,
even if there is a minority opinion in the legal literature adopt-
ing the same position,7" the principle of the best interests of the
minor is also applicable by virtue of the Women's Equality of
Rights Law.7" The Shari'a Appeals Court's attempt to wave a red
flag in the eyes of the High Court of Justice was thus mis-
informed and superfluous.
b. The Islamization of the Principle of the
Child's Best Interests
After describing the process of Islamization of the principle
of the child's best interests, I will explain the phenomenon of
Islamization by first, using the theory of legal pluralism and
then, the fields theory.
i. Description of the Process of Islamization
The Shari'a Appeals Court, by contrast to positive Israeli leg-
islation, views the principle of the child's best interests as having
originated in the Shari'a. The principle underwent a process of
Islamization.7 5 The Shari'a Appeals court ruled:
72. (2000).
73. See Shifman, supra n.44, at 425 (stating: "Section 25 of the Law applies to a
religious court only in the sense that in principle, a religious court too is authorized,
under the circumstances enumerated in the Law, to rule in matters of child custody and
guardianship, but the Section provides no answer regarding the substantive law that the
religious court is obliged to apply.").
74. See Woman's Equal Rights Law, 1951, S.H. 82, Secs. 3(b), 7.
75. The Islamization movement began in the 1970s. It gained power in the Islamic
world after the revolution in Iran. See OLIVIER CARRk, LE NATIONALISM ARABE 178-203
(1993). In Egypt, for example, the Islamization of the law was expressed in the Amend-
ment to the Egyptian Constitution of 1980, in which Section 2 established the Shari'a as
the principal source of the law. See BERNARD BOTIVFAU, Loi ISLAMIQUE ET DROrr DANS
LES SOCIETES ARABES 281-86 (1993). See, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, The Shari'ah: A Meth-
odology or a Body of Substantive Rules?, in ISLAMIC LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 177-98
(Nicholas Heer ed., 1990); Riaz Hassan, Islamization: An Analysis of Religious, Political
and Social Change in Pakistan, 21 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 263, 263-84 (1985); Muham-
mad Aslam Syed, Modernism, Traditionalism and Islamization in Pakistan, 8(4) J. SOUTH
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The Shari'a Court relied upon Section 25 of the Capacity Law,
which is a positive law, whereas in fact the Shari'a Court is
capable of ruling exclusively in reliance upon the Islamic law.
Needless to say, the rules of the noble Shari'a are complete
and provide solutions for all problems or questions.
76
In another ruling, the Court stated that "in this context, we
again stress that the Shari'a Appeals Court applies the orthodox
Shari'a, which it views as a complete and self-contained legal sys-
tem. We have explained this on a number of occasions in the
past."77 Accordingly, the Shari'a Appeals Court ruled that the
Court is "volunteering" its compliance with the Capacity Law,
given that the Islamic Shari'a is a self-contained, complete sys-
tem, which does not require supplementation from any other
law, such as the Capacity Law. Further buttressing its claim to
self-sufficiency, the Court added:
Scholars gave numerous concrete descriptions of the child's
best interests, whereas the Israeli law has no such ability. An
Israeli court would [so it is claimed] have approved the cus-
tody agreement concluded between the parents without ex-
amining whether it evidenced appropriate consideration for
the child's best interests.
78
This description is inaccurate, because the Israeli law pro-
tects the child's best interests and any agreement between the
parents must be consistent with these interests. Thus, I must at-
tempt to prove not only that the Shari'a recognizes the child's
best interests, but also that its protection of children extends be-
yond the protection provided by Israeli law. Furthermore, de-
spite its inaccuracy, the decision indicates a clear internalization
of the dominant dialogue regarding the supremacy of the princi-
ple of the child's best interests." The Shari'a's totality and self-
sufficiency equips it to solve every legal problem, without assis-
tance from the secular legislature. In doing so, the Shari'a Ap-
peals Court fortifies its position, for in its substantive application
ASIAN & MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 62, 62-84 (1985) (providing examples of other Arab
States in which the process of Islamization is not limited to the legal system, but also
includes educational institutions and other social institutions).
76. A. 63/94 (Oct. 13, 1994).
77. A. 4/94 (Mar. 31, 1995).
78. Id.
79. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, LA DOMINATION MASCULINE (1998) (stating that the inter-
nalization of the dominant dialogue is part of the ruling mechanism).
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of the Shari'a, it reigns supreme and the High Court of Justice
cannot preside over it in an instance of appeal, but rather, must
examine if the Appeals Court operated ultra vires in the sense of
having violated the principles of natural justice. s Additionally,
by invoking the self sufficiency of the Shari'a - the banner
waved by the Islamic movement over the entire Arab Islam
world81 - it buttresses its Islamic legitimacy, blunting the scath-
ing criticism of the Islamic movement that was previously di-
rected at the Shari'a courts.8 2
The Shari'a Appeals Court thus enlists the assistance of the
Shari'a, Islam, and God in its struggle against besiegement. The
threat to its legitimacy is, inter alia, the result of the defective
system of appointment of the Qadis, and the implication of Qadis
in the illegal sale of Islamic burial plots.8 3 Invoking Divine assis-
tance is expressed in its admonitions that whoever opposes the
Court Din will be considered an infidel.84 This technique of re-
ligious patronage is more powerful than the objectifying tech-
nique used by the secular legislature.85 Accordingly, by under-
mining the broadened conception of the Shari'a, the Appeals
Court does not violate the rule of law, but rather, infringes on
the freedom of religion. The principle of the child's best inter-
ests is further empowered when classified as a "religious princi-
ple."
ii. Islamization and the Theory of Legal Pluralism
The Shari'a Appeals Court views the Shari'a as an indepen-
dent legal system. There are at least two legal systems: the theory
of the Israeli secular legal system and the Islamic legal system.
80. See, e.g., Gabbi v. Rabbinical Appeals Court, 54(5) P.D. 401, 430, para. 9. See
also comments of Englard, J. in H.C. 2222/99 (1999).
81. See GILLES KEPEL, LE PROPHETE ET PHARAON, LES MOUVEMENTS ISLAMISTES DANS
L'EGYPTE CONTEMPORAINE 179 (La Dhcouverte, 1984); MUNEER GOoLAM FAREED, LEGAL
REFORM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: THE ANATOMY OF A SCHOLARLY DISPUTE IN THE 19TH AND
THE EARLY 20TH CENTURIES ON THE USAGE OF IJTIHAD AS A LEGAL TOOL 107, 109, 114
(1996).
82. See generally Alisa Rubin Peled, Towards Autonomy? The Islamists Movement's Quest
for Control of Islamic Institutions in Israel, 55 MIDDLE EAST J. 378 (2001).
83. MICHAEL DUMPER, ISLAM AND ISRAEL: MUSLIM RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS AND THE
JEWISH STATE 25-62 (1994).
84. MUHAMMAD SAYID AL-ASHMAWY, L'ISLAMISME CONTRE L'IsLAM 30-31 (1989).
"Din" can be translated as "statute."
85. Pierre Bourdieu, Habitus, code et codification, in 64 ACRES DE LA RECHERCHE EN
SCIENCES SOCIALES 40, 41 (1986).
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Muslim scholars regard the Islamic legal system as lex perfecta. It
is neither complemented by, nor reliant upon, the secular legal
system, but is, rather, independent and self-contained. This con-
cept of Islamic law is part of the theory of legal pluralism in the
sense that the construction of the law is not solely the State's
responsibility - other societal organs also participate in build-
ing the edifice of the law. In this case, the second system is the
Divine law. This legal system co-exists with the secular system
without any points of contact. The secular law is the Israeli law
that draws its authority from the sovereign - in this case, the
people of the democratic regime. Islamic law, on the other
hand, is grounded in the Divine Will.
A possible theoretical construction that explains the phe-
nomenon of the two legal systems is the theory of legal plural-
ism.6 Accordingly, the State is not the exclusive author of
norms and a legal system may exist independently from the
State. The concept of the Islamic legal system, as existing inde-
pendently of the Israeli legal system, is incompatible with the
positive law in Israel. In Israel, religious law is viewed as sub-
sumed within the category of a statute, which does not require
proof. Consequently, religious law in Israel is an integral part of
secular Israeli law. Where reference is made to Islamic law in
matters of personal status, the reference is limited to the law as a
material source, in the same manner as it is referred to in Otto-
man and Mandatory laws.
The concept of Islamic law, as subsumed within Israeli law,
was expressed by the Supreme Court in three separate judg-
ments. In the Milhim case, the Supreme Court interpreted the
Qu'ran and reached the conclusion that according to the
Qu'ran, polygamy is permitted, but is not obligatory.87 In the
judgment of Anon v. Anon, the Supreme Court interpreted the
86. See generally NORBERT ROtJLAND, ANTHROPOLOGIE JURIDIQUE 74-96 (1988);
Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate About Legal
Pluralism, 42 J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM 21 (1998); Ruth Halperin Kadari, Legal Pluralism in
Israel: The High Court of Justice and the Rabbinical Courts - After Bavli and Lev, 20 IYUNEI
MISHPAT 683 (1997); Issi Rozen Tzvi, Subject Community and Legal Pluralism (After H.C.
3269/95 Catz v. Jerusalem Regional Rabbinical Court), 23(2) IYINEI MISHPAT 539 (2000);
Ruth Halperin Kadari, More About Legal Pluralism in Israel: Response to Article of Issi Rozen
Tzvi, "Subject Community and Legal Pluralism, " 23(2) IYUNEI MISHPAT 559 (2000).
87. See H.C. 49/54, Milhim v. Shari'a Judge, Akko & District, 8 P.D. 910; see also
Ya'akov Meron, Polygamy for Moslems and the Legality oJ the Prohibition, 3 MISHPATIM 515,
515-39 (1971).
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Islamic law to declare that a child born out of wedlock has no
right to child support from his father."8 In the judgment of Ali
Hamza v. Shari'a Appeal Court of Jerusalem, the Supreme Court
gave a literal construction to Section 130 of the Ottoman Family
Law without making any reference to the sources of Islamic
law.89
Furthermore, the appointments and the powers of the Qadis
are based upon the Qadis Law, a piece of secular Israeli legisla-
tion. The Shari'a courts are the creation of the Israeli legisla-
ture, which grants them a certain form of coercive power, with-
out which they would not exist. This means that the model of
legal pluralism is inapplicable in the case of Islamic law, given
that the body charged with its application is the secular State.
The condition for the emergence of legal pluralism is that the
law itself must originate in communal Islamic bodies or organi-
zations, as in the case of the Israeli-Islamic movement. Conse-
quently, various statements made by the Appeals Court cannot
be viewed as expressions of legal pluralism, given that the Shari'a
courts belong to the secular State judiciary. In this context, the
comments made in the majority opinion of the Katz case are ap-
plicable (the case actually dealt with the Rabbinical Courts, but
the State status of the Shari'a Appeals Court is identical to that of
the Rabbinical Courts):
The Rabbinical Court was established by legislation and is leg-
islatively-based; its budget comes from the treasury and the
Dayanim receive their salaries like all other State employees;
they preside in judgment under the State emblem and their
decisions appear on official stationary. Their orders become
the voice of the State and it is the State that enforces them...
the Rabbinical Court only has the powers that are statutorily
conferred upon it."'
In light of the above, although the phenomenon of Is-
lamization purports to legitimize the Sharaite Court in the eyes of
the Islamic public, it also increases State control over the public
and the Islamic law. It is therefore clear that the Court is not
88. See H.C. 3077/99, Anon v. Anon, 49(2) P.D. 578; see also Ya'akov Meron, The
Child of an Unknown Father in Islamic Law, 23 HAPRAKLIT 407, 407-15 (1966) (revised in
1967).
89. H.C. 9347/99, Ali Hamza v. Sharya Court of Appeal, 55(2) P.D. 592.
90. H.C. 3269/95, Katz v. Jerusalem Regional Rabbinical Court, 50(4) P.D. 590,
604
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bound up with the increased autonomy of the Muslim commu-
nity. In fact, the reality is quite the opposite: Islamization re-
flects the increased State control over Islamic law, its seculariza-
tion, and subordination to the secular system of justice. Para-
doxically, this is really an Israelization and secularization of the
religious law.
Interestingly enough, this is the opposite of the Egyptian ex-
perience. In Egypt, under the 1980 Amendment to the Constitu-
tion, Islamic law became the primary source of Egyptian law.9
In Israel, the Shari'a has been shackled by the State and secular-
ized by its subordination to the decisions of the supreme secular
judicial authority. In response to this, the Shari'a Appeals Court
is attempting to supercede a concept taken from the positive law
by giving it an Islamic coating.
iii. Islamization and the Fields Theory
In my opinion, the fields theory best explains the Islamiza-
tion of the principle of the child's best interests. One of its most
prominent spokesmen is Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist
and anthropologist, who analyzes the societal expanse by anal-
ogy with the field concept:
Diverse, antithetical social phenomena are referred to as con-
current fields of power, co-existing in the same larger power
field. Each field has its agents - the elements comprising a
particular field - that explain and justify the necessity of that
particular field. Within the broader power field, there are
struggles among the agents themselves, expressed by their va-
riant agendas and positions in the hierarchy of a power field.
The agents thereby contribute to the ongoing process of
change and maintenance of the structures of which they are a
part. 92
Interpretation plays an important role in the field of law,
and the nature of the system also dictates the identity of the
main players.93 In the Continental legal system, particular im-
portance is attached to the interpretation of texts by academics,
91. See Kiliam Balz, La reconstruction seculihre du Droit islamique: la Haute Cour Consti-
tutionnelle dgyptienne et la bataille du voile dans les ecoles publiques, in 39 DROIT ET SOCIETt
227, 277-91 (1998).
92. PIERRE BOURDIEU, RAISONS PRATIQUES: SUR LA THbORIE DE L'ACTION 55 (1994).
93. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridicial Field, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 814, 814-53 (1987).
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whereas in the Anglo-Saxon system, practitioners of the law are
the main interpreters. Each player strives to monopolize the in-
terpretation, and the interpretation constitutes an increase of
the interpreter's symbolic capital.
According to Bourdieu, the law itself is a relatively autono-
mous field. There are reciprocal influences between the differ-
ent fields, as, for example, between the academic field and the
social field. A medical professor can have potential power in the
academic field even though academically, his contribution is not
great. Furthermore, the stored strength is utilized in a particular
place and time. This process is dependent upon the exchange
value of the symbolic capital. Another example of this is pro-
vided by the interaction between art and social standing. The
theory of fields is therefore a useful tool for explaining the rul-
ings of the Shari'a Appeals Court.
With respect to Islamic law in Israel, the field comprises the
following players: academics, who are experts in Islamic law; at-
torneys; Qadis of the Shari'a courts; Shari'a advocates, and the
Supreme Court. Prominent advocates generally refrain from ap-
pearing in the Shari'a courts, because their appearance could
undermine their standing as "powerful" professional attorneys.
The power of Shari'a advocates is limited by the general paucity
of their knowledge of Islamic law, which is the result of the
waiver of the minimal statutory requirements for formal educa-
tion.9 4 In the academic field, Aharon Layish's and Ya'akov
Meron's writings on Islamic law, notwithstanding their quality
and quantity, have failed to influence the Supreme Court and
the Shari'a courts. Evidently, neither the Supreme Court nor the
Shari'a courts are willing to rely on authors who are not Muslims.
Thus, only the Shari'a courts, especially the Shari'a Appeals
Court, are left. In its efforts to purge the Shari'a of traces of the
positive law, the Shari'a Appeals Court uses interpretative manip-
ulations.
Regarding the "competition" with the Supreme Court, relig-
ious law in Israel is regarded as statutorily binding, thus vesting
the Supreme Court with interpretative power. Generally speak-
ing, the Supreme Court avoids interference with the rulings of
the Shari'a Appeals Court. In fact, the Court ruled on numerous
94. See 1993, 3 K.T. 1440, 1374. This regulation deals with the representation of
litigants before the Shari'a courts by Shari'a advocates who are not lawyers.
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occasions that in its capacity as the High Court of Justice, "the
Supreme Court will only overturn religious court rulings which
are ultra vires by reason of a denial of natural justice or in excep-
tional cases which demand intervention for the proper adminis-
tration of justice. ''' 5 The Supreme Court grants the religious
courts a relatively broad area for maneuvering, but the Supreme
Court is not without interpretative power. To the extent that the
religious law is statutory law, it is subject to interpretation by the
Supreme Court, whose interpretation is binding. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has not backed down from interpretation of
Islamic law, when necessary.
Under the Supreme Court's rulings in matters regarding
personal status, the religious courts are exclusively competent to
interpret religious law, even at the expense of the general statu-
tory arrangement. The application of personal law, however,
does not extend to matters beyond personal status. Effectively,
this ruling restricts the ability of the religious courts to maneu-
ver." When it comes to personal law, the Supreme Court is au-
thorized to interpret it and its interpretation is binding; this is
also true in relation to the religious law. Regarding the latter,
however, the Supreme Court lacks the necessary expertise for
such interpretation. Thus, the Supreme Court limits the appli-
cation of the religious law and as regards the positive secular law,
the Supreme Court's interpretative authority is exclusive and its
rulings binding.97
In this context, the comments of Barak D.P. (as then
known) bear mention:
In fact, the religious courts are an integral part of the Israeli
judiciary. The law they apply is an integral part of the Israeli
legal system. These are combined tools which dictate that in
all matters connected to civil law, which are not part of the
matters of personal status and personal law, it is incumbent
upon the religious courts to apply the general civil law, as en-
acted by legislature and interpreted and developed by the
95. H.C. 187/54, Brier v. Qadi of the Islamic Shari'a Court of Akko, 9 P.D. 1193.
96. See H.C. 3914/92, Lev v. Tel Aviv Regional Rabbincal Court 48(2) P.D. 491,
505.
97. See F.H. 1/69, Boronowski v. Chief Rabbis of Israel, 25(1) 7,15; see atso M.
Drori, Who is Qualified to Intetpret Secular Legal Provisions Directed at the Religious Court, 3
IYUNEI MISHPAT 34. 941 (1973).
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courts.
9 8
This means that by declaring that the principle of the child's
best interests is an Islamic principle, the Shari'a Appeals Court is
attempting to restrict the intervention of the High Court of Jus-
tice. On the other hand, the High Court of Justice is aware of its
limitations in the interpretation of religious texts and therefore,
attempts to restrict the applicability of the religious law.
Islamic law, however, also belongs to the religious field. In
the religious dimension, there are three central players, who are
attempting to monopolize the religious "truth." The first player
is obviously the Shari'a Appeals Court itself. Next, there is the
Mufti of Jerusalem, who sees himself as the Mufti of Palestine.
The Jerusalem Mufti is active in the raising of funds for the Is-
raeli Muslim community and sees himself as the supreme relig-
ious authority over Palestine in its entirety. 9 The third player is
the Israeli-Islamic movement, both of whose factions attempt to
interpret the religious texts.
This power struggle is demonstrated by considering the sub-
ject of adoption of Muslim children. Qadi Natur adheres to the
traditional interpretation, which forbids adoption, while Cheikh
Raid Salah proposes a broader approach in order to prevent the
smuggling of Muslim children abroad. In essence, this is a clash
between the head of the Shari'a Appeals Court in his official ca-
pacity and the head of the Islamic movement in Israel, each of
the players claiming the authenticity of his interpretation. On
the one hand, this interpretation is external to the Qadi Natur's
judicial function, but essential in buttressing the position of the
Shari'a Appeals Court. On the other hand, the process of Is-
lamization in the case law is intended to strengthen the status of
the Shari'a in both legal and religious arenas. The Shari'a Ap-
peals Court has an interest in demonstrating its loyalty to the
religious law. It is therefore quite natural that the religious
court will "make an effort" to show its adherence to religion.
c. The Principle of the Best Interests of the Child as
Infringing Upon the Muslim Rules of Evidence
Despite its declarations regarding the legal self-sufficiency
of the Shari'a, in reality, the Shari'a Appeals Court needs the Is-
98. H.C. 1000/92, Bavli v. Rabbinical Appeal Court, 48(2) P.D. 221, 247.
99. The author's conversations with the Mufti of Palestine.
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raeli legislature to exercise its authority. An example of this is
the Court's use of secular law for the appointment of welfare
officers. Its reliance upon welfare officers obviates the need for
the evidentiary laws that apply to the Shari'a courts. By using
welfare officers, the Shari'a Appeals Court is actually deleting
Section 1676 of the Mejelle 00 as well as the Sections that follow it
and which deal with rules of evidence, as interpreted by the
Hanafi school.
The Shari'a Appeals Court established criteria and modern
tools for assessing the best interests of the child. In exercising
these tools, the Shari'a Appeals Court can use the services of a
social worker, pursuant to Israeli law,' 0 ' given that the social
worker has both, necessary expertise and training. 112 While the
appointment of a social worker is discretionary, having ap-
pointed one, the Court has to give reasons if it chooses not to
accept the worker's recommendation."s
The social worker's report must include two elements: the
questions asked by the Shari'a Appeals Court and the social
worker's opinion regarding the child's best interests. 10 4 The
Court further ruled that if neither party disputes the social
worker's report, then the Court must take the initiative, because
the Court's role is that of the Guardian General, and in that ca-
pacity, it is the guardian of someone who does not have a guard-
ian. 105
d. The Principle of the Child's Best Interests Blurs the
Distinction Between the Different Schools of Law
The Shari'a Appeals Court adopted a consciously eclectic
approach, utilizing all four Sunni schools as normative legal
sources, despite the absence of any legal or Shai'a-based author-
ity for its deviation from the Hanafi school to which it had been
subordinate. The principle of non-subordination is also men-
tioned in the legal circulars issued by the head of the Shari'a
Appeals Court since 1994. The disengagement from the Hanafi
100. See AL-MAJALLA (3rd ed. 1888).
101. C. 42/93 (July 5, 1994). Hassan al-Asadi gave the judgment and Zoabi con-
curred.
102. A. 48/94 (Jan. 16, 1994).
103. Id.
104. A. 39/97 (May. 15, 1997).
105. A. 50/98 (Mar. 25, 1998).
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was part of an historical development, as, historically speaking,
the Qadis had been accustomed to relying upon different
schools. There is an internal dispute between the schools re-
garding the sources of Islamic law as well as the various branches
of the law. The mandatory reliance exclusively upon the Hanafi
was felt, but it did not contribute to the stability of the Islamic
law, which was finally achieved by legislation. One example is
the Mejelle, which relied upon the accepted norms of the Hanafi
school.
Ultimately, it became clear that the technique of exclusive
reliance provides certainty and stability, but also causes a certain
rigidity. In the Ottoman Family Law, the talfik technique was
used. In that case, the uncertainty was avoided and the Ottoman
legislature succeeded in blazing the trail of reform. When the
Shari'a Appeals Court sees itself as not being restricted to a par-
ticular discipline and refers to different scholars without men-
tioning the school to which they belong, it is, in effect, intention-
ally ignoring a historical development of hundreds of years,
which all contributed to the increase in stability.
The following are two examples of instances in which the
Shari'a Appeals Court diverged from the Hanafi school, without
stating so openly. In the first case, the Shari'a Appeals Court
ruled that in order to assess the child's best interests, it was nec-
essary to consider the child's own desires.'0 6 As discussed above,
giving expression to the best interests of the child is accepted in
the Shafii, whereas the Hanafi expressly rejected the child's
right to choose between his parents. This is also known as "the
right of discernment." The principle of the child's best interests
thus served as a means of blurring the distinction between the
Hanafi and other approaches.
The second case reflecting divergence from the Hanafi
deals with the definition of "custody" in the Shari'a tradition. As
previously discussed, Hanafi law does not clearly define whether
custody is the right of the mother or the child. The Shari'a Ap-
peals Court ruled that custody is simultaneously the right of the
mother, the child, and even God."°7 Imputation of the custodial
right to God universalized the right of action. This law is op-
106. A. 58/92 (Feb. 9, 1993). Thejudgment was given prior to the appointment of
the Qadis Medlag, Natur, and Zo'bi.
107. A. 67/99 (May 31, 1999).
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posed to the Hanafi position, which sees the hadana as a double-
edged system of rights belonging to the mother and the child,
and not as a triangle that comprises the mother, the child, and
God. Incidentally, in its early rulings, the Sharaite Court en-
dorsed the Hanafi rule.""'
Reliance upon different schools means conferring tremen-
dous power on the Shari'a courts to make contradictory deci-
sions. Furthermore, neither the litigants nor the public at large
can have advance knowledge or expectations as to the manner of
the law's interpretation. Ya'akov Meron wrote the following re-
garding the different schools:
The discrepancy between the different streams in Islamic law
is as significant as the discrepancies existing between totally
independent systems of law. The similarity between the
Hanafi and the Maliki approximates the degree of similarity
existing between English law and German law. Each system
has its own institutions, conceptions, and terminology, not-
withstanding the fact that in Islam, all of these systems use
one language - Arabic.' 9
Later on, he adds: "It seems to us that the maximalists - i.e.,
those who choose to deal on an equal basis with all of the
streams and divisions of Islamic law - are in effect minimalists,
who diminish the image of Islamic law, superficially and in dis-
tortion of Islamic law."'")
The conclusion is, therefore, that the absence of a limita-
tion to one system infringes on the rule of law in the narrow
sense. The official law in the Ottoman Period was Hanafi, and
the British and the Israelis also preserved that tradition. Fur-
thermore, the rule of law is undermined by a lack of legal cer-
tainty, which is so critical to litigants in planning their strategies.
The combination of rules external to the Hanafi, together with
the principle of the best interests of the child, increases legal
uncertainty. One of the critiques of the principle of the best
interests of the child is connected to the resultant lack of cer-
tainty of legal rules,' a certainty which all legal systems strive
for, including the Islamic system. The principle of the best inter-
108. A. 33/92 (1992); see also A. 29/93 (Dec. 7, 1993).
109. YA'AKOV MERON, MOSLEM LAW IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 37 (2001).
110. Id. at 43.
111. See Barbara Bennet Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of Children's Rights:
The Search for ajust and Workable Standard, 33 FAM. L.Q. 815, 820 (1999).
2003] THE TRANSITION FROM TRADITION TO REFORM 627
ests of the child, in addition to the talfik, causes legal anarchy or
even a state of non droit. Reliance upon the principle of the
child's best interests blurs the distinctions between the different
schools. The Shari'a Court will choose the opinion that is more
or less consistent with the best interests of the child, regardless
of the school to which it belongs.
Incidentally, it bears mention that legal certainty in a coun-
try like France, has constitutional status.'1 12 Strangely, the Shari'a
Appeals Court relied upon the principle of judicial stability to
support its claim that its rulings ought to have the power of bind-
ing precedent.'1 '
2. Presumptions
Presumption is a frequently used tool in rules of evidence.
In certain cases, presumption presumes the existence of a cer-
tain fact, unless proven otherwise (presumption of fact). In
other cases, certain basic facts must be proven in order to exer-
cise the presumption (presumption of law). Both Israeli" 4 and
English laws'' recognize presumptions of fact and presumptions
of law.
Presumptions of fact are assumptions, which may be made
when a particular fact has been proved, in the absence of any
evidence refuting the assumption. Presumptions of law are legal
conclusions that the judge is obliged to draw when a certain fact
has been proved and there is no evidence refuting the proven
fact. There are two types of presumptions of law: presumptions
that can be refuted with contradictory evidence, and those which
are absolute - not admitting of rebuttal. Presumptions of fact
and presumptions of law that can be refuted thereby transfer the
burden of proof.
Presumptions are notjust evidentiary techniques used to es-
tablish the truth. They are also partially intended to protect cer-
tain interests and values. Factual presumptions express our life
112. Bertrand MathieI, Retroactivit des loisfiscales et securitgjuridique: l'application du
principe constitutionnel implicite: observations 6 propos de Ia dicision 98-404 DC du 18 dgcembre
1999 du Conseil Constitutionnel, R.F.D.A., 89-95 (1999).
113. A. 39/97 (May 15, 1997).
114. 1 E. HARNON, THE LAWS OF EVIDENCE (1974); S.Z. Feller, The Categories of Pre-
sumptions: Note on Subach, Tzlenko and Anon Judgments, 13 MECHKAREI Mishpat 357, 357-
80 (1996).
115. ADRIAN KEANE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 656-63 (5th ed. 2000).
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experiences, which indicate that, generally speaking, events oc-
cur in a particular manner, in particular factual sequences. This
conclusion relies upon probability alone; however, there is still
the possibility of claiming that the assumption is not consistent
with reality." 6 Presumptions of law, or legal presumptions, are
not exclusively a tool for arriving closer to the truth, but also
reflect certain value judgments. The classic example of this is
the presumption of innocence, for not every person who bene-
fits from the presumption is indeed innocent of the offence.
Similarly, the concern for the child's interests engenders pre-
sumptions regarding his lineage." 7
The Shari'a Appeals Court borrowed certain concepts from
the secular Israeli law and grafted them onto classical Islamic
law. Given that the guiding principle regarding the hadana in
the Shari'a Appeals Court is the child's best interests, the rules
determined by judicial authorities are actually presumptions,
which, if adhered to, will ensure the child's best interests. But
like other presumptions, these too may be refuted. For exam-
ple, in judgment 22/98, it was held that maternal guardianship
of the child was preferable for as long as the minor was in need
of female care, provided that the female guardian was an adult,
legally competent, and unattached." 8 Given that factual basis, it
was presumed that she would be capable of educating and taking
care of the minor. The holding does not constitute an absolute
axiomatic rule; rather, it is a presumption drawn on the basis of
certain facts, which may be refuted. A person claiming the non-
applicability of the presumption bears the burden of proof.
Thus, for example, if a woman wants to prove that another man
is preferable to the biological father, she must prove it. It should
be noted that this provides an example of the main shortcom-
ings of the innovations made by the Shari'a Appeals Court. In
the modern framework, as reflected in CEDAW and the Conven-
tion for the Rights of the Child, presumptions are not accept-
able, as they are expressive of prejudicial views. Consequently,
116. P. Foriers, Presomptions et fictions, in LES PR9SOMPTIONS ET LES FICrIONS EN
DROIT 7, 7-26 (Ch. Perelman & P. Foriers eds., 1974).
117. Jerzy Wrolblewski, Structure et fonctions des prsomptions juridiques, in LES
PRE.SOMPTIONS ET LES FICrIONS EN DROIT 43, 57-58 (Ch. Perelman & P. Foriers eds.,
1974).
118. (Feb. 28, 1998).
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the Shari'a Appeals Court ceased to apply this approach prior to
reaching total equality.
a. The Classic Rules as Presumptions
The Shari'a Appeals Court applied the theory of presump-
tions in two main fields: the child's age and the mother's mar-
riage to another man.
i. Age
Regarding the age of the child, as noted above, it is in accor-
dance with the Kadri Pasha Code that the daughter stays with her
mother until the age of nine, whereas the boy stays with her until
the age of seven. Having reached these ages, the children are
transferred to the custody of the father. The Shari'a Appeals
Court held that both ages represent presumptions, namely that
until the age of seven for a boy and nine for a girl, the child's
best interests dictate remaining in the mother's custody, whereas
thereafter, best interests favor a transfer to paternal guardian-
ship. These presumptions, however, are refutable. In the event
that the mother can prove that, despite having passed the age of
hadana, as fixed by the scholars, the child's interests nonetheless
dictate staying with the mother, then the Court will rule that the
child should remain in her cutody.119 The establishment of the
specific ages is an ijtihad"° of the scholars and the important
factor is the principle of the best interests of the child.' 2 ' Al-
though there are early rulings that the establishment of the ages
is ijtihad,22 it is clear that the source is not the Qu'ran or the
Sunna, and that the matter is open to interpretation. Even so, in
its current rulings, the Court combines the theory of the ijtihad
with the theory of presumptions. In any event, the rulings re-
119. A. 28/94 (June 14, 1999); A. 248/98 (Nov. 29, 1998).
120. Ijtihad refers to the making of an intellectual effort to derive legal norms from
the sources of law.
121. A. 13/92 (July 7, 1992); see also A. 36/93 (June 5, 1993).
122. See, e.g., A. 72/89 (Jan. 30, 1990). The decision reads:
The Shari'a Appeals Court cannot but mention that the principle of child cus-
tody with one of the parents is a way of guarding the child's interests. This is
evidenced by the fact that in many Islamic States, there is no age limit; [the
age at which the child is supposed to be in the father's custody] and the age
limit is an itihad of the jurists, in the absence of a text from the Qu'ran or the
Sunna.
Id. See also A. 41/88 (1988); A. 51/88 (1988); A. 39/90 (1988).
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flect the ijtihad with a certain orientation to realizing a particular
goal. It should be stressed that the ijtihad is not used as an inter-
pretative tool for textual understanding in order to ascertain the
divine will, but rather, for the sake of improving the child's sta-
tus. For example, in one judgment, Qadi Natur ruled:
this Court notes that it is the presumption of the necessity of
the mother's care that determines the ages of hadana for mi-
nors, and that the interests of the minor no longer requiring
such care dictate his placement with the father, so that he can
become accustomed to being in the community of men.
Consequently, scholars also presumed that if a child still re-
quires mother's care, then his best interests are served by stay-
ing with the mother. The scholars emphasized, however, that
this is not a general principle, valid in every case, but rather a
general presumption made on the basis of a set of facts,
which may be valid for most, but not all of the cases. The role
of the presumption is to determine which party bears the
onus of proof to refute the presumption as to what the child's
best interests are. Thus, if the minor is at an age at which he
requires his mother's care, then the father has the onus of
proving that despite the factual situation, which points to the
child's need of his mother's care, it is nonetheless not in the
child's best interests to be in his mother's custody. In the
same way, the mother bears the onus of proving that the
child's being among adults will work to his detriment, even
after the age at which he no longer requires his mother's
care. It is the mother who has to refute the presumption of
the child's best interests of being with the father after a cer-
tain age. 12:
This summary of the law appears in other cases too. In an-
other case, the Shari'a Appeals Court ruled that the mother had
not proved that the children's interests dictated their remaining
with her, even after the termination of the hadana period, nor
had she proved that remaining with their father would not be in
the children's interests. 24 Consequently, as far as the child's
age, it is clearly an arbitrary choice of the scholars.
There are three judgments, however, which do not support
the theory of presumptions. According to these judgments, the
theory of presumptions is not to uproot the dichotomy of the
123. See A. 17/2000 (2000).
124. See A. 97/94 (July 20, 1997).
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hadana, but rather, to indicate that the dichotomy is a tool for
realizing the child's best benefit. 25
The blurring of the dichotomy found expression in one ex-
ceptional judgment where the Shari'a Appeals Court took an ex-
treme position and ruled, against the traditional Islamic law, that
after the hadana period, when the children were no longer in
need of their mother's care, they should go to a place which was
better suited for them, without declaring that any particular
place was a priori preferable to any other place. 1 26 As previously
discussed, however, under Islamic law, after the termination of
hadana, the wilaya period - during which the men are the
guardians of the minor - begins.1 27
The dichotomy is further distorted by the judicial endorse-
ment of joint custody exercised by the mother and the father, in
which they divide the days of the week for having custody of
their child.1 28 A division of this kind is absolutely foreign to Is-
lamic law, which clearly delineates the periods for child custody
with either the mother or the father, but not jointly. Joint cus-
tody has its roots in the West and chronologically speaking, is a
recent phenomenon.
29
Even so, the Shari'a Appeals Court did not draw all possible
logical conclusions dictated by its extension of the hadana pe-
riod. In one of its judgements it stated that only during the
125. In these judgments, the purpose of the theory of presumptions is to divide
the time periods for the custody of minors in the way that is thought to be best for the
child. During the period of early childhood, the child should generally be with the
mother, whereas after a certain age, determined by gender, the child is transferred to
the custody of the father.
126. A. 30/96 (May 7, 1996).
127. DE BELLEFONDS, TRAITE, supra n.7, at 153.
128. A. 244/98 (Nov., 22, 1998).
129. Kirsti Kurki-Suonio, joint Custody as an Interpretation of the Best Interests of the
Child in a Critical and Comparative Perspective, 14 INT'LJ.L. POL'Y & FAM. 183, 188 (2000).
This Article states that:
[t]he ideals regarding custody arrangements in the context of divorce have
been the following: first, maternal preference, reflecting the idealized notion
of care by a loving mother, which only later brought mothers full custodial
rights; second, custody by the parent, who, without any consideration of her
or his sex, could provide the child with a psychologically happier childhood;
and third, care by both parents, fulfilling the child's needs in harmonious,
complementary co-operation as joint custodians.
Id.; see also Shannon Dean Sexton, A Custody System Free of Gender Preferences and Consistent
With the Best Interests of the Child: Suggestions for a More Protective and Equitable Custody
System, 88 Ky. L.J. 761, 801 (1999-2000).
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hadana period is the father obligated to make child support pay-
ments.1 30 Beyond that time period, maternal custody of the
child is no longer by virtue of hadana, and the father, therefore,
bears no obligation to make hadana-based payments. When the
Court extends the period during which the children are with the
mother, it is no longer hadana. The Court further ruled that it
was unable to use the ijtihad technique to extend the financial
obligation of the father to children beyond the ages of seven and
nine.
The ruling of the Shari'a Appeals Court is illogical. First,
according to the Hanafi school, there is no unanimity regarding
the age. It was only the later scholars who fixed the respective
ages of the children. The ijtihad technique cannot be resorted
to in the absence of a text, and the case here concerns judicial
opinions and not a text. As stated, unanimity does not exist in
the Hanafi or outside of it. Furthermore, Islamic law established
a very clear distinction between the hadana period, during which
the minor is generally with the woman, and the wilayah period,
which is spent with the man. When a child remains with the
mother without defining the period as "hadana," it is legally il-
logical. This, in fact, is the creation of a new situation, which was
not foreseen by the scholars. This ruling eliminates the dichot-
omy that was determined by the sages. Instead of two periods,
one under the tutelage of women and the other under that of
men, an intermediary situation is created, where the child's be-
ing with his mother without custody is considered either hadana
or wilaya, or both.
ii. The Mother's Marriage to Another Man
The question of the woman who marries another man is
comprehensively dealt with in the judgment 28/98.131 In that
case, following his parents', the appellants', divorce, the son re-
mained with his mother. The father applied to the Shari'a Ap-
peals Court, claiming that the mother's marriage to another
man would cause her to forfeit her hadana rights. A social
worker's report stated that the child's interests dictated that he
stay with his mother. The Sharaite Court ruled that in this case,
the mother had lost her right. The Court relied on the com-
130. See A. 59/98 (May 12, 1998).
131. (May 26, 1998).
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ments of the scholars from the different schools and the hadith
of the Prophet who said: "[y] ou are preferable to him for as long
as you do not marry."
Having reviewed the relevant law, the Shari'a Appeals Court
asked two questions: (1) what is the logic behind the rule; and
(2) is it an absolute rule or does it admit exceptions? The Court
ruled that the Islamic law was based on the best interests of the
child and had constructed its rules accordingly. The presump-
tion was that granting another man guardianship of the child
would cause that person to adopt an improper attitude towards
the child.
In explaining the rationale behind its decision, the Shari'a
Appeals Court opined that the mother's forfeiture of her custo-
dial rights in the event of marrying another person is a rule de-
rived from the controlling principle of the child's best interests.
The principle is based on the presumption that marriage to an-
other man places a woman at his service. She will inevitably be
burdened with discharging her obligations to that man, and this
will occur at the expense of properly attending to her son's
needs. A mother with hadana who is unable to properly care to
her child's needs is universally considered as having forfeited the
hadana, conferring it to the next in line. The exception referred
to in the hadith takes into account the inability of the new hus-
band to display compassion toward a child who is not his or to
grant him warmth and love, displaying a hostile attitude instead.
The Court then proceeded to question whether the rule is
an absolute one or whether it has exceptions. The Court quoted
Ibn 'Abdin:
Conceivably, he [the child] could have a relative who displays
hostility towards him and wishes his death, whereas his
mother's husband has compassion for him. The relative may
wish to take him in order to harm him and harm her, or in
order to use the maintenance payments of the child and the
like. Conceivably, the relative may have a wife who will hurt
the child more than the mother's husband and it could be
that he has sons and is, therefore, fearful for the daughters.
If the Mufti or the Qadi know that this is the case, then the
mother should not be denied her child, because the hadana is
based upon the best interests of the child. 132
132. IBN 'ABDIN, supra n.20, at 565.
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A petition was filed against this ruling, claiming, inter alia, that it
violated the woman's rights and did not correctly apply the Ca-
pacity Law. In Shaabani v. Sharaite Court of Appeals, the Court
ruled:
With the agreement of the attorneys for the parties, we de-
cide that the proceedings regarding the custody of the child
shall be restored to the Regional Shari'a Court of Nazareth.
The Court will receive an expert opinion on the welfare and
the rights of the minor at this time, and shall decide upon the
issue of his custody, being guided by the minor's best inter-
ests in the light of the comments of the Shari'a Appeals Court.
The welfare authorities of the Nazareth municipality shall ap-
pear before the Sharaite Court of Nazareth and they too shall
give their expert opinions to the Court.133
The High Court did not make any decision on principle, being
content simply to affirm the previous ruling. When the Court
approves an agreement regarding child custody, however, it
must act in the minor's best interests. In approving the agree-
ment, the High Court effectively stated that the child's best in-
terests would be determined in accordance with the judgment of
the Shari'a Appeals Court. It should be remembered, however,
that the Appeals Court was prejudicial to the woman. If the fa-
ther were to marry another woman he would not forfeit his
hadana rights. On the other hand, it was incumbent upon the
mother to prove that the child's interests dictated his being left
in her custody.' 34 Furthermore, it is important to emphasize
that the rules of classical Islamic law were not made exclusively
on the basis of the best interests of the child as a meta principle,
but rather as a consideration of equal value, to be considered
together with all other principles. In that particular case, the
Court contradicted its own rulings under which an exception to
an accepted presumption could be proved via the report of a
social worker. '3 5
Using the principle of the child's best interests has made
other legal tools superfluous. In fact, the penetration of the
child's best interests principle into the rulings of the Shari'a
133. H.C. 3872/98, Shaabani v. Sharaite Court of Appeals (Jan. 5, 1999) (not yet
published).
134. See H.C. 187/54, Brier v. Qadi of the Islamic Shari'a Court of Akko, 9 P.D.
1193, 1198.
135. See, e.g., A. 248/98 (Nov. 29, 1998).
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courts has emptied the classical rules of Islamic law of content.
The rules are being invented and not discovered. When the
question is one of emptying the Islamic law of content, the sub-
stantive claim of the unchanging essence of Islamic law is often
raised. Here, however, there is no clearly defined Islamic es-
sence that can be built or destroyed, or that can undergo a pro-
cess of authentication and verification. When the issue is one of
law, this changes, because there are more or less clear norms
that can be described at any particular moment in time and com-
pared with norms at another point in time. While there is still
the issue of the burden of proof, the transfer of that burden be-
comes irrelevant, because in custody disputes the Shari'a courts
tend to resort to a social worker's report, which, in the majority
of cases, is endorsed by the court. Consequently, the proposi-
tion that Islamic law recognizes the principle of the child's best
interests and the appointment of a social worker is meaningless
in terms of the rules of Islamic law.
The restriction of the scope of Islamic law was not the result
of an initiative of the legislature or the Supreme Court. It was
the Shari'a Appeals Court itself that brought about the situation.
The principle of the child's best interests is a veritable magic
formula, which solves all problems. The normative depletion of
Shari'a occurred as part of the Islamization of the principle of
the child's best interests. As indicated above, the theory of legal
pluralism could not provide an appropriate explanation of this
process. According to the fields theory, on the other hand, the
Shari'a Appeals Court Islamized the concept of the child's best
interests in order to retain control of its symbolic legal capital in
the battle with the Supreme Court.
II. AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THE CHANGE
In this part, I will attempt to explain the metamorphosis of
the Shari'a Appeals Court's rulings. By way of introduction, it
must be stressed that there is no single explanation, but that the
metamorphosis was the confluence of different factors that
caused the change. The first category of explanations attempts
to respond to the question of why the Court decided to adopt
the reformist approach. The second category attempts to ex-
plain why there was a reform at all.
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A. Why the Reformist Approach?
The first category of explanations purports to give a struc-
tural explanation by presenting the three options with which the
Appeals Court was confronted: traditionalist, reformist, and
modernist. The other category of explanations identifies the
reasons for the transition to the reformist approach with its
search for legitimization.
1. The Structural Explanation
The Shari'a Appeals Court was confronted with three op-
tions. The first was to continue applying the Kadri Pasha Code,
as it reflects the Hanafi school. This is the traditional approach
and the one closest to classical Islamic law. The second option
was to initiate a reform, using the legal tools provided by the
Shari'a itself, such as reliance upon the well-known ijtihad of Is-
lamic law, in order to effect a transition to a reformed approach.
Third, there was the option of applying the principle of the
child's best interests, as reflected in the Capacity Law. Support
for the third option can be found in the modernist approach.
The first option, the adoption of the traditional approach, is
difficult due to the pressures from the Israeli legislature and the
Supreme Court, as well as pressures from women's organiza-
tions, threatening to restrict the jurisdiction and powers of the
Shari'a Appeals Court by lobbying for legislation.'36 Conse-
quently, the Court must attempt to present an image of enlight-
enment and flexibility.
The second option was frequently mentioned by Islamic
thinkers, as early as the middle of the nineteenth century. Jamal
Aldin al-Afghani, for example, attempted to create a synthesis
between Islam and modern life, by suggesting an interpretation
of Islam that would be compatible with modern life, while main-
taining the traditional Islamic framework. This challenge
guided and continues to guide the reformist stream in Islam, the
aim being to bring about internal change within the Islamic le-
gal framework without causing an upheaval. Muhammad Abdo,
a student of al-Afghani, has carried on this tradition and still
136. M. Shawa, The Family Courts Law, Bill (Amendment No.4) (Equating of Judicial
Powers): Is it Really a Blessing for Moslem and Christian Women?, 44(2) HAPRAKLT 358, 358-
400 (1998). Since then, the Family Court Law, 1995, S.H. 1537, as amended by 5th
Amend. of Nov. 14, 2001, S.H. 1810, has been adopted.
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views the ijtihad as a legitimate tool.1 3 7 The classical scholars,
however, reject Abdo's view. 38 Abdo maintained that it was pos-
sible, indeed crucial, for Muslims to offer different interpreta-
tions, adducing the polygamy question as proof of the feasibility
of innovative interpretations. The fourth Chapter of the Qu'ran,
fourth verse, known as "Women Surate," provides the legal basis
for polygamy. The verse reads:
And if you fear that you will not be fair in dealing with
the orphans, then marry of women as may be agreeable to
you, two, or three, or four; and if you fear you will not deal
justly, then marry only one or what your right hands possess.
That is the nearest way for you to avoid injustice.' 39
Verse 128 of the same Chapter states: "[y]ou cannot keep
perfect balance between wives, however much you may desire it.
But incline not wholly to one, so that you leave the other like a
thing suspended. And if you amend and act righteously, surely
Allah is Most Forgiving and Merciful."14 The first verse permits
polygamy, but restricts it to four women simultaneously. The
second verse states that it is impossible for a man to treat these
women equally, even if he should so desire. On their face, the
verses are contradictory, with one verse making polygamy contin-
gent and the other verse establishing a requirement that no per-
son is capable of satisfying. Muhammad Abdo explained the
first verse by placing it in the material context, whereas the sec-
ond verse relates more to the psychological element of love.
One can control the first factor, the material dimension, but not
the second factor, the emotional dimension. Muhammad Abdo
adds that a harmonious reading of the verses invites the conclu-
sion that polygamy in Islam should be restricted and only per-
mitted in urgent situations.141 Under the traditional approach,
polygamy is a man's right, whereas a modernist approach would
not recognize polygamous marriages. The reformed approach
137. M.A. ZAKI BADAWI, THE REFORMERS OF EcYPT (1978) [hereinafter BADAWI];
TARjQ RAMADAN, Aux SOURCES DU RENOUVEAU MUSULMAN: D'AL-AFGHANI A HASSAN AL-
BANNA, UN SIftCLE DE REFORMISME ISLAMIQUE (1998).
138. Compare JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAw 70-71 (1964)
with W. Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?, 16 INT'LJ. OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES 3, 41
(1984).
139. QU'RAN (Hazrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad trans., 1988).
140. Id.
141. 4 M.'ABDU, TAFSIR AL-QURA'N 348-49 (2002).
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suggested by Muhammad Abdo is an intermediate approach, le-
gitimizing polygamy, but in a restricted form.
For Muhammad Abdo, Islam is a religion and, hence, not
restricted by a particular discipline. Talfik may always be used to
facilitate a more desirable result. Talfik is a technique by which
the legislator, who is not content with rules from a particular
school, deduces rules from a number of disciplines.14 2
The modernist approach emerged due to the inability of
the reform approach to synthesize Islam with modern life and
modern concepts. The failure of the reform was particularly evi-
dent in its inability to deal with the issue of universal human
rights. There was an increased recognition of the importance of
exercising human rights, but this was insufficient in the confron-
tation with an unequivocal, clear text, the reliability and con-
tents of which were unimpeachable. An example of this is the
verse dealing with the beating of women. 4 ' The result is that
the modern scholars proposed changing the rules of the game.
In a sense, this is a change of the basic paradigm. Below are two
outstanding examples.
a. Nasir Hamid Abu Zayd
Nasir Hamid Abu Zayd has a particularly critical reading of
the religious Islamic discourse. 144 He attempts to understand
the ideological considerations controlling the religious dis-
course, with no distinctions between moderates and extremists,
given that in his view, they share a common basis.
In his books, he proposes a new reading of the canon of
Islamic law, not being content with reform interpretations. His
central claim is that the Qu'ran was written with Divine inspira-
tion and is not the precise word of God. The Prophet Muham-
mad was a person living in a particular time and place and as
such, conveyed the Divine message in his own words. In the
transition from Divinity to the mortal Prophet, the message is
142. See BADAWI, supra n.137, at 79-82.
143. See, e.g., Ronald L. Nettler, Muhammad Talbi's Commentary on Qur'an 4:34 A
"Historical Reading" of a Verse Concerning the Disciplining of Women, 24 MAGHREB L. REV. 19,
33 (1999) (interpreting verse 34 of the fourth Chapter of the Qu'ran).
144. See, e.g., NASIR HAMfI ABU ZAYD, NAQD Al-KHITAB AL-DINI, (3d ed. 1995);
NASIR HAMID ABU ZAVD, AL-KI-I'AI WAL-TA'WI (2000); NASIR HAMED ABU ZEID, CRITIQUE
DU DISCOURS RF IGIEUX (Muhammad Chiret trans., 1999).
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severed from its Divine source, and becomes human. The
Qu'ran must, therefore, be interpreted accordingly.
Regarding the Sunna, the religious discourse centers exclu-
sively on the authenticity of the hadith and not on its meaning,
given that after being convinced of the authenticity of the
prophesy, the content of the prophesy should be accepted in its
totality. According to Abu Zayd's approach, both the scholars
and the Islamists broadened the meaning of the text, interpolat-
ing their own views into it. As such, comments of the scholars
are subsumed within the category of the "miraculous." In other
words, having become part of the Divine canon, the scholars'
comments are legitimate subjects for legal interpretation. The
broadening of the "miraculous" category limits the role of logic.
Abu Zayd, therefore, calls for a new reading of the sources of
Islamic law, which can lead to a humanistic view of Islam.
b. Mahmud Muhammad Taha and Abdullahi An-Na'im
Mahmud Taha, a Sudanese, is the founder of the movement
of the Republican Brothers. The essence of his philosophy is
presented in his book, THE SECOND MESSAGE OF ISLAM. 1 45
According to Taha, the Qu'ran consists of two basic
messages: the Divine message that was given to the Prophet
Muhammad in Mecca and the Divine message that was given to
the Prophet Muhammad in Medina. This presentation does not
constitute a diversion from classical Islamic law. An accepted
tenet of Islamic law is that chronologically later verses are nor-
matively preferable when in conflict with earlier verses. The ear-
lier verses are not revoked and continue to be part of the
Qu'ran; they are no longer normative however, with respect to
the laws derived from them. 14 6
The change introduced by Mahmud Taha and followed by
Abdullahi An-Na'Im, who interpreted his teaching,147 lies in the
fact that, in Taha's view, the main and authentic message was the
earlier message from Mecca. The message from Medina is no
145. MAHMUD MUHAMMAD TAHA, THE SECOND MESSAGE OF ISLAM (Abdullahi Ah-
med As Na'im trans., 1987).
146. See, e.g., IMAM ABU AL-QASIM BIN SLAMEH, AL-NASIKH WAL-MANSUKH FI AL-
QU'RAN AL-KARIM (1994).
147. ABDULLAHI AHMED As NAIM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION, CIVIL LIBER-
TIES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992).
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more than a temporary one, which was only valid for the time
during which Muhammad the Prophet ruled in Medina.
This construction is an attempt to reconcile the model of
human rights with Islam. Muhammad the Prophet began by ad-
dressing mankind as a whole, speaking of the Garden of Eden,
Hell, and the stories of the early Nations. In the Medina Period,
both his style and tone changed, given that his words were pri-
marily addressed to those who already believed in him. The
others were infidels or the people of the Book. The laws regard-
ing women were introduced together with penal legislation.
The reformist approach had no appropriate answer to the prob-
lem of human rights in these areas. Taha's solution was, there-
fore, to disregard the problematic verses. The determination
that the verses from Medina are of a higher normative status is
exclusively the result of interpretation.
It cannot be said that either of these interpretative models
was accepted in the Islamic world. A divorce suit was filed
against Naser Hamed Abu Zeid on the ground of his having be-
come a heretic. As such, he could not remain married to a Mus-
lim woman under Islamic law. Additionally, his request to re-
ceive a Professorship in the Department for Arabic Language in
Cairo was rejected. The Leiden University in Holland currently
employs him.148 Muhammad Taha also failed to receive official
renown. The various theses that he developed were not ac-
cepted and the President of Sudan, Numeri, ordered his execu-
tion in 1984.
The Shari'a Appeals Court thus finds itself in an untenable
situation. On the one hand, it is under tremendous pressure
from feminist organizations. On the other hand, it is unable to
continue the process of transition to the reformed framework.
These pressures caused the Court to introduce changes from
within the Islamic law, without the help of the Israeli legislature.
Implementation of the human rights model would amount to
legitimizing the abolishment of the Shari'a system. Adoption of
such a position would undermine the constitutional basis for the
Shari'a Court's authority. The institution, therefore, protects it-
148. See George N. Sfeir, Basic Freedoms in a Fractured Legal Culture: Egypt and the
Case of NaserHamed Abu Zayd, 52 MIDDLE EASTJ. 402, 414 (1998); Baudoiuin Duperet,
Argumentation des tribunaux: Le proces, 151 MONDE ARABE MAGRHEB-MACHREK 19-22
(1996).
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self within the law. The results reached by the Appeals Court are
dictated by reality and are connected to the status of the Court
and its maneuvers within the fields of law, politics, and religion.
2. The Explanation of Legitimization
The Shari'a Appeals Court was statutorily established and its
legality is assured. Nonetheless, there is another problem relat-
ing to its legitimacy. Legitimacy has been defined as "a senti-
ment whereby people feel morally obliged to submit to power
that is perceived to be valuable and conforms to the general will
of the society."
' 149
The Shari'a Appeals Court currently finds itself confronting
a challenge to its legitimacy. The challenge has a number of
possible sources. First, the Court is located in a State that de-
fines itself as "Jewish." The Jewish nature of the State conflicts
with the Palestinian identification of the Arab minority in Israel
and with the religious Islamic aspect. Qadi Natur attempts to
exploit this national aspect to draw attention to the fact that
Arabs are a minority that is discriminated against and deprived
of its rights. For a religious court, the more important aspect is
the fact that the State is not an Islamic one. According to some
of the scholars of the Hanafi school, there is no prohibition for
non-Muslims to appoint the Muslim Qadis. In this context, Ibn
'Abdin cites the opinion of another Muslim scholar that "the ap-
pointment of the Qadis is valid, regardless of whether the ruler is
just, an oppressor, or even a heretic." Ibn A'bdin also quotes the
opinion cited in the Tatrachania,' that the appointer of a Qadi
need not be a Muslim himself.5 '
Despite the lack of a prohibition, the situation is not ideal in
terms of Islamic law. If non-Muslims are unable to testify against
Muslims in Shari'a courts, 15 2 whence the power to appoint its
149. 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY 722 (Frank N. Magill & Hector
L. Delgado eds., 1995).
150. This is a collection of laws written by Alim Bo Awla, who passed away in 1384.
The collection was dedicated to Prince Tatrakhan. See Muhammad Khalid Masuod,
Brinkley Messick & David S. Powers, Muftis, Fatwas and Islamic Legal Interpretation, in
ISLAMIC LEGAL INTERPRETATION: MUrs AND THEIR FATWAS 14 (Muhammad Khalid
Masud, Brinkley Messick & David S. Powers eds., 1996).
151. 4 IBN 'ABDIN, HASHIYATI RADD AL-MUHTAR 307-08 (1960). See also 3 ALFATAWI-
AL-HINDIYA, BULAK 1310, 307 (1973).
152. ABD AL-KARIM ZIDAN, NiZAM AL-QADA' FI AL-SHARI'A AL-ISLAMIYYA 175 (3d ed.
1995) (accepting non-Muslim testimony in cases of necessity).
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judges? Bechor Shalom Shitrit served as the Minster for minori-
ties in 1949 and stated (on the basis of Hanafi scholarship):
Given that the Islamic community in Israel requires a legal
authority for matters related to personal status, some kind of
resolution must be made. In my opinion, the easiest way is to
declare the election of a Supreme Shari'a Judge by members
of the Islamic community, who will have the authority to ap-
point both, judges and Muftis in Israel, with the approval of
the Prime Minister of the State of Israel. This will enable us
to satisfy all the opinions and we will not have to rely upon
the scholars of Islamic law, whose views on the issue are prob-
lematic. 1 5
Given the fact that the State of Israel abolished the auton-
omy which Muslims had enjoyed in regulating their religious
matters during the Mandate Period in Israel until 1937, the
Qadis are not appointed by a Muslim organization. The resul-
tant harm did not have an effect solely on Muslim organizations.
The appointment procedure proved unsuccessful in ensuring
that the Qadi positions would be filled by people from the Mus-
lim population with broad and formal Shari'a education. This,
in turn, led to a crisis in which the Sharaite Courts lacked the
confidence and trust of the public who tended to deride
them.'54 Furthermore, in the past there were Qadis who were
implicated in approving the sale of holy Islamic objects. 5'
The Shari'a Appeals Court began attempting to reinforce its
legitimacy within the Shari'a system in Israel. These attempts ne-
cessitated receiving Islamic legitimacy and not secular legiti-
macy, given that the Shari'a Appeals Court is a religious court,
and the laws it makes must reflect the Shari'a law. Thus, the
Court attempted to ground its rulings in classical Islamic litera-
ture. In matters of custody, it did not rely on the Capacity Law,
even though, generally speaking, the results would be the same.
153. BECHOR SHALOM SHITRIT, THE SUPREME ISLAMIC SHARI' COUNCIL 16 (1949)
(introducing legislation in the land of Israel tinder the Turkish and British Rule).
154. Yitzhak Reiter, Qadis and the Inplementation of Islamic Law in Present Day Israel,
reprinted in ISLAMIC LAw, THEORY AND PRAcrICE 205-31 (R. Gleave & E. Kermeli eds.,
1997). For demonstration of awareness of this contempt by the Shari'a Appeals Court,
see, e.g., A. 156/98 (Oct. 27, 1998).
155. See, e.g., A. 22/74 (Nov. 19, 1974) (referring to Fatwa of the Jaffa Qadi regard-
ing the cemetery).
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a. The Reasons for the Change
While the first sub-section attempted to find the reasons for
the choice of the reformist approach, this sub-section attempts
to give three categories of reasons for the change itself. These
explanatory factors are: legal considerations, the relation be-
tween law and social change, and the Qadis' education.
i. The Legal Considerations
The Shari'a courts do not operate in a vacuum and are
subordinate to the Israeli legal system. The State of Israel has
signed and ratified numerous conventions relating to human
rights.156 At the internal level, there is the legislative pressure
exercised by the State concerning matters of personal status. In
Family law, there is no single, unified territorial law for all areas;
rather, the legislation has regulated particular areas in a piece-
meal fashion. 5 ' The problem is further compounded as a result
of the Bavli and Levjudgments, which narrowed the jurisdiction
of the religious law, obliging the religious courts to ensure
human rights. The result is that the legal environment presses
for the restriction of religious law and the application of secular
law. In addition to the general principle governing the Israeli
law of child custody, there is the principle of the child's best
interests, which has forced the Shari'a Appeals Court to alter its
strategy. The Shari'a Appeals Court gave a new interpretation to
the Muslim law by ruling that the principle of the child's best
interests was a meta principle. The penetration of this considera-
tion into the classical law of the Hanafi school caused the transi-
tion from the classical framework to the reformist framework.
ii. Law and Social Change
It can be claimed, that the practice of the Shari'a Appeals
156. See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
A/52/38/Rev.1, pt. 11, paras. 132-83, esp. para. 157 (Dec. 8, 1997) (stating: "The Com-
mittee regretted the fact that Israel had maintained its reservations to Articles 7(b) and
16 of the Convention. It also regretted the fact that women could not become religious
judges and that the religious laws that to a considerable degree govern family relations
discriminate against women.").
157. See E. Naveh, Application of the Shari'a in Civil Courts in the Twentieth Century:
Comparative Research of Case Law in Matters of Personal Status, of the Wakf in an Islamic State
(Egypt) and a non-Islamic State (Israel) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew Univer-
sity of Jerusalem).
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Court reflects the change that has occurred within traditional
Muslim society. On the one hand, the law is a tool for social
change.158 Laws lead to the enactment of social legislation that
protects workers' rights or the rights of particular minorities or
minorities in need. There are also examples of ideological legis-
lation aimed at maintaining the character of the State. An exam-
ination court reform in Indonesia in the area of Family law indi-
cates that, over four years, there was a significant change in the
patterns of behavior in the particular areas that were the subject
of the reform. 5' The relation between law and society is based
upon reciprocity. Law influences society by establishing the
norm. Thus, something that is normative becomes normal. 6 "
On the other hand, political and societal processes also influ-
ence the law.
This Article proposes that the changes that occurred in the
legal conceptions of Islamic law can be regarded as reflections of
societal change. In order to understand this claim, I will turn to
examples from France and the Soviet Russia. The socio-eco-
nomic and political models are also expressed in Family law. Ac-
cording to the Marxist approach, the family organism undergoes
various changes in accordance with the economic changes oc-
curring in society at large. The institution of the family has un-
dergone numerous changes that have taken the form of differ-
ent structural models: the patriarchal family, the bourgeois fam-
ily, the workers' family, the agricultural family, and the social
family of workers.'6 1 The assimilation of these changes into the
societal framework necessitated an appropriate economic frame-
work.
This framework is provided by the State in the form of the
abolition of private property and the socialization of means of
industrial and agricultural production. In the socialist family,
158. For discussions of social change and the law see STEVEN VAGO, LAW AND SOCI-
ETY 285-318 (5th ed. 1997); Donald L. Horowitz, The Q'uran and the Common Law: Islamic
Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 Am. J. Comp. L., 233-93 (esp. 218-54)
(1994).
159. See generally June S. Katz & Ronald S. Katz, Legislating Social Change in a Develop-
ing Country: The New Indonesian Marriage Law Revisited, 26 AM. J. Comp. L. 309, 309-20
(1978).
160. Baudouin Dupret, Le juge et lejeu de la normalisation islamique due Droit positif,
42J. oF LEGAL PLURALISM, 199, 213-14 (1998).
161. V. Tadevassian, La famille et le developpement social en U.I.S.S., in FAMILLE,
DROIT ET CHANGEMENT SOCIAL DANS LES SOCIETES CONTEMPORAINES 88-119 (1978).
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women are equal to men. The concepts of a "patriarchal struc-
ture" and of the "head of the family" have disappeared.'62 This
is an example of the change in the family law comporting with
the social-political change. Incidentally, following the collapse
of the Eastern Bloc, the Socialist family and the Socialist theory
were attacked from all sides, and both, analysis and practice pro-
ceeded in more liberal directions. 63
Another example of this transition is France. Until the first
half of the twentieth century, the French Family law was based
on two basic concepts: puissance paternelle and puissance maritale.
The concept of puissance represents power and strength. Even
after the Revolution, the family was still paternally controlled.
The 1970 law purported to replace the concept of puissance
paternelle, reflecting the social development, which now waved
the flag of autoritg parentale, in which there was no longer any
differentiation between the sexes and the presumption of mater-
nal custody at an early age no longer applied." 4
The change in the law was not intensive and, furthermore,
as a tool of change, the legal system is only partially effective
today. Dissonance still exists between the normative plane and
reality. Continuing with the French example, however, the 1970
legislation reflected a widely accepted reality. By comparison, in
the Soviet Russia, the State succeeded in influencing the family
model by way of legislation.
Arab society in general, including the Islamic society and
the family unit, has undergone many changes since the establish-
ment of the State. 6 ' The status of a woman is different despite
the fact that her status is still inferior to that of the Jewish woman
and the Arab man. There have been changes in the level of edu-
cation, and Muslim women now go out to work. Urbanization
and economic changes have weakened the extended family unit.
Most of the judgments of the Shari'a Appeals Court only involve
the husband and the wife, and the Court is rarely concerned
162. O.M. Stone, The New Fundamental Principles of Soviet Law and their Social Back-
ground, 18 I.C.L.Q. 392, 410-11 (1969).
163. See Mari V. Antoholshay, The 1995 Russian Family Code: A New Approach to the
Regulation of Family Relations, 22 R. FOR CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN L. 600-35 (1996).
164. MALAURIE PHILIPPE, CouRs DE DROIT CIVIL 431-34, 461-62 (1998).
165. Ibtisam Ibrahim, The Status of Arab Women in Israel, 12J. FOR CRITICAL STUDIES
OF THE MIDDLE EAST 107, 107-20 (1998); E. SHTENDEL, ISRAELI ARABs: BETWEEN THE
HAMMER AND THE SYCLEL 178-88 (1992).
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with the grandmother. The long list of those entitled to hadana
according to the Hanafi school is now totally irrelevant. A wo-
man can establish her own household without the aid of her hus-
band and she even receives assistance from the State in case of
divorce. Effectively, this enables her to receive custody of the
children. The Shari'a Appeals Court's interpretation of the law
represents the changes and events that have occurred within the
Muslim society. The Qadis in Israel have assumed the role that
in Islamic society traditionally belonged to the Muftis, who medi-
ated between the theoretic Islamic law, which had been formu-
lated in the legal literature of the scholars, and the concrete Is-
lamic law. '66 The process of change began with the ruling issued
by the Mufti and the judgment was then inserted in the Islamic
books of law. From there, it became authoritative.' 67  The
followup is that the effect of the reform was not restricted to
changing the applicable norms regarding child custody, but
rather, involved a total revamping of the role of the Qadis in
Israel.
iii. Qadis' Education
In explaining the transition to the reformist approach, im-
portance attaches to the Qadis' education. A legal change is not
a change unrelated to people's lives. As stated by Donald L.
Horovitz: "Innovations require innovators; legal innovations re-
quire legal innovators. No theory of legal change can afford to
166. See Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick & David S. Powers, Muftis,
Fatwas and Islamic Legal Interpretation, in IsLAMIC LEGAL INTERPRETATION: MUFTIS AND
THEIR FATWAS 3-32 (Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick & David S. Powers
eds., 1996).
167. See WAEL B. HALLAQ, AUTHORITY, CONTINUrTY AND CHANGE IN IsLAmic LAW 233
(2001) (stating:
Our enquiry compels us to conclude that it was the Muftis and the au-
thor-jurist who responded to the need for legal change by means of articulat-
ing and legitimizing that aspect of general legal practice in which change was
implicit. The Qadis, as a community of legal practitioners, may have been in-
volved in the application of a newer or weaker practice, assuming that it per-
meated all of the schools. This was merely a necessary, but by no means suffi-
cient, condition for the implementation of change. In the entire process of
change, the Qadis' contribution, whenever it was present, was only at an em-
bryonic stage and could not, in and by itself, have culminated in change. For
in order to effect legal change in a formal and authoritative manner which
represents the full extent of the process of such change, the intervention of
other agents was needed. These were the Mufti and the author-jurist.
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neglect the forces that animate lawyers, the more so as legal sys-
tems tend to be arcane and therefore unusually dependent on
those with specialized knowledge.""' 6
The process of changing Islamic law is not a simple proce-
dure, given the perception of it as the Divine Will from which
the sages derive and learn about the Will. Admittedly, there is
an opinion in the professional literature that the concept of Is-
lamic law being derived from religion is basically a later innova-
tion of al-Shafi'i. ' There are even those who maintain that,
practically speaking, the Qu'ran or the collections of hadiths are
insufficient for the purposes of learning the Islamic law. 70
Nonetheless, the subjective beliefs of Muslims are important.
Anyone interested in changing Islamic law must be aware of the
departure from the Muslim paradigm. There is also the fear of
bid'a.171
Islamic law differs from the Western culture, which sees
changes, inventions, and innovations as positive .phenomena.
The Islamic legal tradition does not take a favorable view of
changes or innovations in matters of religion. One of the expla-
nations for the transition to the reformist approach is the fact
that there has been a tendency on the part of the Qadis to ignore
the restrictions rooted in traditional Islamic law and religion.
Their disregard for these restrictions is the result of the fact that
the Qadis of the Appeals Court received secular education,
which is reflected in their rulings.
Islamic law requires that candidates for the position of the
168. Donald L. Horowitz, The Q'uran and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and
the Theory of Legal Change, 42 Am. J. CoMp. L. 233, 250-51 (1994).
169. WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMic LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION
TO SUNNI USUL AL-FIQH 30-35 (1997).
170. DE BELLEFONDS, TRAIT9, supra n.7, at 31-34.
171. The bid'a is an innovation without the reliance upon the way the Prophet
behaved. Not all innovations are necessarily undesirable, but there are still various cate-
gories of bid'a. Even so, the opposition to innovation is inherent in the religious per-
ception, which represents the whole and the absolute. For a discussion of the problem
of bid'a and its definitions see ABD AL-WAHAB RASHID SALIH ABU SAFYIH, SHARH AL-ARBA 'IN
LIL-NAWAWI F1 TAWBIN JADED 70-100 (2d ed. 1993); VARDIT RISPLER, TOWARD A NEW UN-
DERSTANDING OF THE TERM BID'A DER ISLAM 320-28 (1991); MUHAMMAD KHALID MASUD,
The Definition of Bid'a in the South Asian Fatwa Literature, in 27 ANNALES ISLAMOLOGIQUES
55-75 (1993); MUHAMMAD AL-ATAWNEH, THE BID'A IN THE VIEWS OF MODERN WAHABIS
(unpublished).
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Qadi have, inter alia, a Shari'a education.172 The Egyptian prac-
tices regarding the appointment of Qadis and Muftis were ex-
amined (over the years 750-868) by Mod Du Baker, and they
indicated that as opposed to the lecturers in Islamic law, or Muf-
tis, there was no official requirement for the Qadis to have stud-
ied Islamic law. Even so, most of the Qadis did have formal edu-
cation in the Shari'a.'1 73
Prior to its recent amendment, 174 the Qadis Law required
neither general education nor formal Shari'a education. There
is no statutory requirement for an academic degree or studies in
an institution of Islamic law. The Knesset addressed the subject
when the law was adopted. M.K. Yosef Chamim (Mapam) and
Tufik Tubi (Maki) raised the issue of education. Moreover, Zer-
ach Werhaftig (then Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Jus-
tice Committee of the Knesset) explained that there were no suf-
ficient Muslim candidates with law degrees, nor were there
schools in Israel for education in Islamic law. Thus, the law
could not prescribe restrictions that would prove impossible to
comply with. 17
5
The High Court of Justice did not see fit to interpret the
Qadis Law in a manner that would impose a requirement of for-
mal legal or Shari'a education:
There is no doubt that it is preferable that the offices of the
Qadis be filled by people who have the appropriate knowl-
edge and education, and even legal education would prima
facie enhance the candidates' suitability. However, legal edu-
cation is not one of the conditions included in Section 2 of
172. 8 AL-ZUHAYLI, AL-FIQH WA-ADILATIHI 6237 (1997); AL-MAWRDI, AL-AHKAM AL-
SULLTANIYYA WA-AL-WILAYAT AL-DINIYVA 60 (1983).
173. Mohd Daud Bakar, A Note on Muslim Judges and the Professional Certificate, 20
A.Q. 467, 467-86 (1999).
174. See Qadis Law, 1961, S.H. 339, amended by 10th Amend., 1969, S.H. 555. Sec-
tion 2 instructs:
The following persons are eligible to be appointed as Qadis. Any Muslim:
1. who has had suitable training in Shari'a law;
2. whose way of life and character befit the status of a Qadi in the State of Israel;
and
3. who is at least thirty years of age and is married or had been married.
Id. Section 2A of the Qadis Law adds that a Qadi must be an Israeli citizen. ld. Rule
11(1) of the Qadis Rules provides an alternative qualification between "knowledge or
ability to study the Islamic Shari'a." See Qadis Regulations, Procedures and Work of the Qadis
Appointment Committee 5756 (1996).
175. See D.K. (1961) 1723.
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the Law. Similarly, the tests established in Rule 11 of the
Qadis Regulations do not include any requirement for formal
Shari'a education. 1
76
The appointment of the Qadis in Israel is, therefore, based more
upon political rather than professional considerations, given
that the Shari'a system has been unable to enlist Muslims with
professional Shari'a education. Today, none of the Qadis serving
in the Shari'a system have any formal Shari'a training.
177
The education of the Qadis is of crucial importance to their
rulings. 178 In the absence of sufficient control over Islamic law,
the change and the reform of the law have been expedited with
greater ease. Qadi Natur has a first degree in law and a first de-
gree in Islam and Arabic literature. Qadi Zoebi Avd worked as
an advocate for a period of twenty years. Yet, Qadi Zoebi usually
does not indicate the substantive sources of Islamic law and is
content with making general statements based on the writings of
the scholars and their texts.179 His main contribution is in the
area of legal procedure. In his conception, there is no clear dis-
tinction between the Israeli civil procedure and the Shari'a pro-
cedure. He rarely cites to case law and he speaks of the "Canon"
in an absolute sense, as if there were one universal law, without
any attempt to qualify it by the positive Israeli law. As previously
176. H.C. 891/01 Zo'bi Ubaid v. the Minister for Religious Affairs, Tk-EI 2001(2)
1186. The Supreme Court displayed extreme paternalism. It was within the Court's
power to intervene on a number of grounds. At one level, the Supreme Court could
have seen that on its face, the decision recommended that the candidate of the petition
was obviously unreasonable, preferring a non-lawyer to a lawyer, even though there was
no reason to oppress the advocate. On the second level, another interpretative option
was open to the Court. The Qadis Law required neither formal Shari'a nor legal educa-
tion, given the dearth of people with law degrees or formal Shari'a education at the
time of the Law's adoption. Yet, in the passage of the forty years since the Law's adop-
tion, conditions changed. The Court could have interpreted the Law in the spirit of the
time in which the law was being interpreted. See Barak in C.A. 105/92 Re'em Contrac-
tors Engineers Ltd v. Upper Nazareth Municipality et al, 47(5) P.D. 189, para. 10. To-
day, there are numerous Islamic lawyers and also a large number of people with formal
Shari'a education.
177. The Qadi of the Shari'a Court in Haifa, Ziyad 'Aslia, is currently studying to-
ward a second degree in Islamic law in the Sharaite College of Hebron.
178. The Qadi Zaki Madlaj. His father and grandfather served as Qadis. He has a
Matriculation Certificate and serves as a Shari'a advocate. This Article does not include
his rulings, which amount to mere restatements of the appellate writs of the parties and
very frequently cite the Malabiani without distinguishing between the text of the Kadri
Pasha and the Alabiani commentary. After this, the rulings examine the factual bases of
the appeal, without presenting any Sharaite or legal analysis.
179. See, e.g., A. 122/98 (Oct. 21, 1998). The dispute itself is dated Nov. 2, 1998.
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stated, generally speaking, no references are made to the works
of jurists, with the exception of reliance on the book of Cheikh
Abu Zahra, in which the Shari'a is discussed as it was practiced in
Egypt on the basis of writings of Ibn al-Hamam.1 8 ° As is well
known, the Egyptian legislature intervened in a series of laws,
making a quasi-codification of Islamic law in that field, but this
codification does not relate to all fields. The Ottoman Family
law never actually applied in Egypt and is therefore a different
Islamic law, even though in Egypt there is also reliance upon the
Hanafi to a certain extent.
An important contribution in the transition to the reformist
approach in the area of child custody was made by Qadi Natur.
In reading his judgments, one discerns a lack of sufficient famili-
arity with the methodology of Islamic law.'81 In surveying the
law, Qadi Natur examines the legal literature, and, from all avail-
able views, chooses the most flexible one. This, however, is not
the criterion for adopting an opinion. The preferable opinion
should have a stronger textual basis. 18 2 This system is known as
"taljik" and is generally used by Islamic legislators. A Qadi, how-
ever, should not make use of talfik unless he is the Sultan. By
law, Qadis are restricted to the Hanafi teachings. The result is
that the reform is facilitated by the lack of familiarity with the
methodology of the Shari'a rules.
In the nineteenth century, the ijtihad was the refuge of the
reformists in their attempt to develop the Islamic law. The ques-
tion is whether the Shari'a Appeals Court utilizes the ijtihad. The
position taken by Qadi Zoebi regarding ijtihad is not consistent
across his rulings. In one of the rulings the Qadi states:
[i]t goes without saying that according to the principles of
Islamic law, we can not reconcile the change of the rules with
the changes of the times. Article 39 [of the Mejelle] is a con-
stitutional and judicial principle, which opened the door of
ijtihad [which was never closed] to adapting the rules to the
places where they were issued." 3
180. MERON, supra n.ll, at 4.
181. Conceivably, there is control over the methodology used in Islamic law, but it
receives no expression in the case law. Alternatively, the failure to use Islamic method-
ology is intentional, given that this methodology may inevitably lead the Court to the
traditional interpretative format, thus frustrating attempts at a reform.
182. OMAR SLIMAN ABDALLA AL-ASHKAR, AL-WADIH FI SHARH QANUN AL-A|IWAL AL-
SHAKHSIYYA AL-URDINI 10-1] (1997).
183. A. 6/96 (Feb. 27, 1996) (emphasis added).
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In another judgment, Qadi Zoebi cites Section 1801 of the
Mejelle, which states that the ruling law is the Hanafi, unless the
Sultan gives a specific instruction otherwise.184
The two apparently contradictory rulings can be reconciled
by recognizing that the ijtihad used by Qadi Zoebi is restricted to
the Hanafi school.
Qadi Natur did not take a clear position regarding the appli-
cability of the ijtihad. In both legal circulars regarding the Wahf
and in some of his rulings, however, the Qadi made it clear that
he is not limited to the Hanafi school, and that he prefers the
law that is more beneficial to the people. In a judgment, Qadi
Natur wrote:
Since the appellant's attorney told us that we are obliged to
rule exclusively in accordance with the Hanafi school, even
though he knows that the issue itself is a source of dispute,
our tendency is to try and mediate between the different
opinions, i.e. talfik. [We accomplish this] by relying on the
opinion which is less rigid with people and thus, more accom-
modating, even if it involves adopting a view which is not the
Hanafi view. We see no difficulty in adopting this approach,
for Islam is a unity. 185
Qadi Natur, therefore, sees himself as a mujtahidfi al-madhab
without expressly saying so. The mujtahid mutlak is the highest
level of the scholarly grading of the sages and the mujtahidfi-al-
madhab falls into this category. A close connection exists be-
tween the non-restriction to a particular school and the classifi-
cation of a sage as a "mujtahid mutlak." 86 Qadi Natur is not
mujtahid mutlak because he is operating within the framework of
the four Sunni schools. In order for the talfik to be valid, the
mujtahid must rely on Dalil, a text.1 87 In the case of Qadi Natur,
such reliance does not exist. Rather, there is presumably a graft-
ing of the principles taken from the principles of civil law onto
classical Islamic law.
It could be said that this is not ijtihad in its traditional sense.
184. A. 7/97 (Sept. 1, 1997). Incidentally, there is no clear distinction between
the Section of the Law and the interpretation.
185. A. 174/2000 (Jan. 30, 2001).
186. See, e.g., Lutz Wiederhold, Legal Doctrines in Conflict: The Relevance of Madhab
Boundaries to Legal Reasoning in the Light of an Unpublished Treatise on Taqlid and Ijtihad, 13
ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY 234, 251 (1996).
187. Wael B. Hallaq, Taflik, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 161 (2000).
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Ijtihad is a determined effort to draw the particular classical rules
from the sources of the law.' The Shari'a Appeals Court does
not interpret the sources. In the Qu'ran itself, there is no men-
tion of the custody of children. There are two hadiths of the
Prophet, and there is the dialogue between Abu Bakr and Omar.
The Court does not take issue with the hadith of the Prophet,
nor does it question its authenticity. It does not try to derive
rules from the source, but rather, attempts to find the ratio legis
(wisdom) in the words of the scholars and not the words of God
or of the Prophet."8 9 Consequently, the analysis takes place at a
level below the sources. The choice of the writings of the schol-
ars is not consistent with the classical Islamic methodology and
there is no explanation for the choice of any particular sage.
The picture is, therefore, one in which the Qadis of the
courts are partially alienated from the material sources of Is-
lamic law (as it exists through the words of the scholars), and
partially from the primary sources of Islamic law. As stated
above, this actually facilitates the process of reform.19 ° The diffi-
culty in the implementation of reform derives from the fact that
the law is a religious law. In any process of reform in Islamic law,
there is a presentation of a new methodology. This was the case
in relation to Muhammad Abdo and it is also the case with Pro-
fessor Hashim Kamali."9' Additionally, this is the case with the
188. AL-SARAKHSI, supra n.22.
189. E.g., A. 174/2000 (Jan. 30, 2001).
190. Despite the secular legal education of Qadi Zoebi and Qadi Natur, both of
them are cut off from the developments occurring in Israeli law. This Article already
noted that the Shari'a Appeals Court ruled that the Capacity Law does not apply to the
religious courts. Had it ended with that, it could be claimed that the Court was chal-
lenging the secular legal system. In one of the judgments, however, Qadi Natur at-
tempts to justify the non-applicability of Israeli law, as I previously observed. Thisjustifi-
cation, however, is not consistent with Israeli case law. In one of his rulings, Qadi Natur
cites an old version of Professor Menashe Shawa, from 1983, while the judgment itself
was given in 1991, after the third edition had already been published. Even the cita-
tions to Sections in the law are divorced from the context and the case law in the Arabic
world, and are occasionally inaccurate. For example, citations were made to the Law of
North Yemen, despite its revocation after the unification of Yemen, which lead to a
unified law being passed for all of Yemen (A. 92/98 (Aug. 18, 1998)). Similarly, Qadi
Zoebi interprets the Israeli laws without the assistance of the Supreme Court. For ex-
ample, the judgment 233/98 deals with matters of jurisdiction regarding inheritance
and there is no use made of the rulings of the Supreme Court, aside from the case law
cited by the parties, and no reference is made to any legal literature.
191. See generally Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Issues in the Legal Theory of Usul and
Prospects for Reform, in 40 ISLAMIC STUDIES 5 (2001).
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modernist stream of Abdullahi An-Na'Im, Mahmud Taha, and
Abu Zeid. Nonetheless, as long as the members of the Shari'a
Appeals Court remain unfamiliar with the methodological rules,
which was the problem of the reformers and the modernists, the
problem does not arise.
CONCLUSION
This Article observed that the rulings of the Shari'a Appeals
Court developed from the classical approach in the direction of
the reform approach. The path adopted by the Court involved
the use of techniques taken from the secular civil law, apparently
influenced by Professor Shifman. Despite the close similarity be-
tween the analyses of Professor Schiffman and of the Shari'a Ap-
peals Court, an effort has been made to hide the borrowing
from the civil system by way of the Islamization of the principle
of the child's best interests. As opposed to the theory of legal
pluralism, which did not provide a convincing explanation, the
fields theory of Bourdieu indicated that the Shari'a Appeals
Court worked in that manner in order to manipulate its inter-
pretation of the Islamic law.
Together with the description of the transition from the
traditional approach to the reformist approach, this Article pro-
posed five explanations for the process itself. The structural ex-
planation showed that the approach adopted by Shari'a Appeals
Court was in fact the approach dictated by reality. The Court
was unable to allow itself to retain its traditional position due to
the threat of its powers being curtailed. On the other hand, the
Court was unable to adopt the modernist approach, which would
render its very existence superfluous. An additional explanation
for the process of transition to the reform framework is found in
the theory of legitimacy. The Shari'a courts in Israel have been
in a state of crisis relating to their legitimacy since their incep-
tion, given that the State within which they operate is non-Mus-
lim, and due to the absence of formal Shari'a education among
the Shari'ajudges. The legitimacy of the existence of the Shari'a
Appeals Court must therefore originate in religious Islamic legit-
imacy and not secular legitimacy. These two reasons attempt to
explain why the Court decided to choose the reformist ap-
proach.
This Article also attempted to explain the reason for the
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change. The first explanation was based upon the fact that the
Shari'a courts do, not exist in a legal or legislative vacuum.
Rather, they find themselves in an environment replete with
human rights legislation at both the internal and international
levels. This is the legislation that the Court cannot ignore. The
second reason for the change is the fact that the Shari'a Appeals
Court played the role of the Mufti to the extent that the Court
transferred and translated the social change within Islamic law.
The third explanation focuses on the secular education of the
Qadis and their unfamiliarity with the rigid Islamic rules. Their
lack of knowledge allowed more flexibility, thus facilitating re-
form.
These changes within Islamic law prove the extent to which
the Islamic law in Israel differs from the classical Islamic law.
Thus, the expression "Israeli Islamic law" is an exact one and
describes the precise legal situation of Islamic law in Israel. The
Israeli Islamic system is a compilation of statutes from different
legislators (British, Israeli, and Ottoman), and laws rooted in the
Hanafi school, as has been interpreted by the Shari'a Appeals
Court. The topic is of importance on a number of levels. Re-
garding the Islamic law, this Article has shown the dynamics of
the practice in the sense that it is no longer the classical Islamic
law. The importance of the Article increases to the extent that it
indicates the manner in which the law of a minority is formu-
lated by the different forces working upon it.
This Article also illustrated that Islamic law is not Islamic
jurist law, i.e., a law which has been developed and interpreted
by jurists who did not necessarily belong to the State framework;
rather, it is judge-made law.19 Islamic law applied in Israel by
the Shari'a Appeals Court is not the law of the writings of the
scholars, but rather, the law that was created by the Qadis for the
Shari'a Appeals Court. Its rulings have accelerated the seculari-
zation of the Islamic law in Israel and its severance from the
classical sources.
This Article indicates that one cannot analyze Islamic law in
a general manner; rather, one must analyze Israeli Islamic law in
192. See Herbert J. Liebesny, Comparative Legal History: Its Role in the Analysis of
Islamic and Modern Near Eastern Legal Institutions, 20 AM. J. COMp. L. 38, 38-52 (1972);
BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAw 113 (U.Ga. Press. 1998).
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the same way that one examines the Algerian Islamic law' 93 and
the Anglo-Muhammadan law.' 9 4 The Israeli Islamic law is also
distinct from classical Islamic law due to the codification of dif-
ferent parts of the Islamic law. It was the act of codification, as
such, that connected Islamic law to the State. The particular ar-
eas that underwent the process of codification became part of
the positive State law, and will therefore be interpreted similarly
to the other laws of the State. What really occurred is the Israe-
lization of Islamic law.
193. JEAN-ROBERT HENRY ET FRANCOiS BALIQUE, LA DOCTRINE COLONIALE DU DROIT
MUSULMAN ALGIRIEN: BIBLIGRAPHIE SYSTEMATQUE ET INTRODUCTION CRITIQUE (1979).
194. S.G. Vesey-Fitzgerald, Le droit Anglo-Musulman, in 16 REVUE INTERNATIONALE
DE DROIT COMPARE 250-63 (1954).
